War Studies Program

Purpose

Gain foundational knowledge vital for the remainder of the course, including the levels of war framework.

Objectives:

• How are militaries organized? What frameworks help us study war? How do you read a military map?

1. 1. Learn the levels of war
   2. Learn how military forces are organized and echeloned
   3. Learn the basic vocabulary needed to discuss war and military operations
   4. Understand how to read military maps and symbols

Readings:

• Kagan Readings (Reading Packet)
• U.S. Department of Defense, Ch. 1, “Theory and Foundations,” Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States
• U.S. Department of the Army, Army Field Manual 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics
  • Definitions of tactical terms, pp. 15ff
  • Tactical mission graphics, Appendix A-1, p. 435ff
• All of the maps under the Austerlitz (1805) Campaign section

Videos:

• Reading a Topographical Map
  • SMCT: Identify Topographic Symbols on a Military Map
  • SMCT: Identify Terrain Features on a Military Map
• Military Symbols
  • Squad Movement Formation & Techniques
  • The Rifle Platoon Dismounted Movement Techniques | Vintage US Army Film
  • TANK TACTICS: Fast Armored Tactics (Begin at 5:25)

Purpose:

Apply the terms and concepts you learned in lesson 1 to the study of a particular campaign.

Objectives:

1. Understand the the Austerlitz Campaign of 1805

• • Learn how to read military operational history with maps
  • Learn how to evaluate a campaign
  • How did each actor understand the situation at the start of the period covered by the reading? How accurate were their respective pictures?
  • What assumptions did each actor make about what the others would do and his own capabilities?
  • What plans did each actor make to achieve his objectives based on that understanding?
  • Were the plans good? What would that mean?
  • How well did each actor execute his plans?
  • How well did each actor adjust his understanding of the situation both to new information and to changes in the situation itself?
  • Why did Napoleon win? Why did the coalition lose?
  • How did political, diplomatic, and inter-personal considerations affect the conduct of military operations?
  • What lessons should each actor (including Napoleon) have drawn from this campaign?

2. Which actor was best (and which was worst) at each level of war from strategic to tactical? Bring evidence to bear!
3. How did each side try to shape the other’s perceptions of the situation and its own intentions? Which was more successful? Why?

Readings:

• David G. Chandler, Austerlitz 1805: Battle of Three Emperors (London: Osprey Publishing, Ltd., 1990), pp. 6–20
• Frederick W. Kagan, Chs. 17–18, 21–23, The End of the Old Order: Napoleon and Europe, 1801–1805 (Cambridge, MA, MA: De Capo Press, 2008)

Videos:

• Napoleon’s Masterpiece – Austerlitz 1805

General (Ret.) John R. Allen

General (Ret.) Allen is a retired U.S. Marine Corps four-star general and former commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force, and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. Following his retirement, Allen served as advisor to the secretary of defense on Middle East Security and appointed as special presidential envoy to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL by President Barack Obama. Allen is also the co-author of the book Turning Point: Policymaking in the Era of Artificial Intelligence.

Purpose:

War in reality vs. war on paper: visualize a battlefield, a campaign, and a war.

Objectives:

• Apply lesson one and two framework to the Gettysburg campaign; focus on visualizing battles on terrain

1. 1. Understand how to “see” terrain using military cartography
   2. Understand how terrain affects combat in particular technological and doctrinal circumstances
   3. Understand how the operational level of war interacts with tactical decision-making before and during combat
   4. Understand how strategic considerations shape tactical decision-making
   5. Understand the moral and ethical consequences of military decision-making
   6. Understand how some military theorists and practitioners interpreted and implemented Napoleonic warfare

Readings:

• Stephen Sears, Chs. 1–2, Gettysburg (New York: Mariner Books Reprint, 2004)
• James McPherson, Chapter 21, Battle Cry of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988)
• Excerpts from Mark Grimsley and Brooks Simpson, Gettysburg, A Battlefield Guide (Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1999)
• Gettysburg Campaign Maps

Videos:

• Ronald F. Maxwell, director, Gettysburg (1993)
• Understanding Gettysburg
  • Civil War Infantry Tactics
  • Civil War Artillery
  • Civil War Analysis of Terrain
  • Civil War Logistics
  • Civil War Medicine
• Decision-Making & Levels of War
  • Tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war
  • Change the plan or persist; interplay of the levels of war; decision-making in uncertainty

Purpose:

Learn an additional language to describe military operations and theory, and evaluate the utility of that language in understanding traditional military theory.

Objectives:

• What is war? What should a theory of war achieve? Can it forecast an outcome?
  1. Read Clausewitz Books I and 8 and discuss the questions above
  2. Learn the basic concepts of nonlinearity, complexity, and chaos theory in the scientific/mathematical context from which they arose
  3. Evaluate the validity of applying those concepts to the understanding of On War

Readings: 

Block 1: Chaos Theory, Clausewitz, and Moltke

• Azar Gat, Ch. 6, “The Reaction against the Enlightenment,” A History of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to the Cold War, pp. 141–57
  • This section situates Clausewitz in the context of the Counter-Enlightenment or German Movement and introduces some of the philosophical trends and ideas we talk about in class.
• Clausewitz, On War (Book I, Chapters 1–8, Book II, Chapters 5–6), pp.75–123 and 156–74
  • This is the core Clausewitz theory and the portion of the book that best represents his finished thought. Read it extremely closely. Look at the various analogies and metaphors he uses. Pay attention to the “extremes” and reflect on what he means by the concept of an extreme. You may find it useful to look at http://csmt.uchicago.edu/glossary2004/dialectic.htm if you are not familiar with the philosophical concept of the dialectic.
• Hajo Holborn, “The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 281–95
  • This is a brief and brilliant essay on a phenomenally complex personality. The interplay between Moltke and Clausewitz requires careful examination. Reflect on the ways in which Moltke is a true Clausewitzian—and the ways in which he clearly is not. The following short excerpt from Moltke’s writings may help clarify.
• Optional: Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, Chs. 5, 9, and 11,  Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman behind the Making of On War

Block 2: Chaos, Nonlinearity, and Complexity

• Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War,” in Thomas J. Czerwinski, Coping with the Bounds: A Neo-Clausewitzian Primer
  • This is another, more detailed and broader, exposition of chaos theory, now with explicit reference to war, military theory, and, especially, Clausewitz. It specifically addresses On War, Book 1, Chapter 1, which is assigned for the next block of this lesson. You may want to read that first, or at least have it handy when reading the Beyerchen.
• Edward Lorenz, Chs. 1 and 4, The Essence of Chaos (Seattle, WA: Univ. of Washington Press, 2008) (Focus on the section that starts with “Searching” subhead and read until the end of the chapter).
  • Lorenz was a meteorologist who made some of the most important intellectual breakthroughs in the formation of chaos theory as a mathematical discipline. This reading has nothing to do with war in principle, but, rather, describes what was at the time a new way of looking at aspects of the world that had been supposed previously to be rule-bound and predictable

Purpose:

Reflect upon the correct relationship between military operations and high politics (or policy) in order to decide whether you believe that Clausewitz or Moltke had it right.

Objectives:

• How much can and should a political leader intervene in military operations?
  1. Understand Clausewitz’s views on the relationship between politics (policy) and military operations at every level. Are his views coherent or contradictory?
  2. Evaluate Moltke’s portrayal of Clausewitz’s views (consider both the Moltke reading and the footnote in On War noted below). Did Moltke get it right?
  3. Why was this dispute of such moment to Moltke? (Look to the Craig reading for this.)
  4. Was Moltke wrong, or had Clausewitz simply failed to foresee the kind of challenge Moltke faced?
  5. What does it mean to have a “system of war” or “war as a system?”
  6. Explore the utility of reading the work of Helmuth von Moltke the Elder through the prism of nonlinearity, complexity, and chaos theory

Readings:

Block 1: Clausewitz on Politics and War

• Clausewitz, On War, pp. 61–71
  • Notes by Clausewitz and his wife regarding the nature of the composition and the manner of its publication. This is extremely important front-matter. You need to understand how On War took the final form that it did and what aspects of it best reflected Clausewitz’s most advanced thinking.
• Re-read Clausewitz, Chs. 1 and 2, On War, pp. 75–99, Book I
  • Seriously, re-read them. There is no amount of re-reading of On War that will cease to be of interest.
• Clausewitz, Book VIII, Ch. 6, Part B, On War, pp. 605–10
  • Especially see the note on p. 608 (This is short and vital—especially the footnote. We say again: READ THE FOOTNOTE!)

Block 2: Moltke and Clausewitz

• Clausewitz, Carl von Clausewitz: Two Letters on Strategy, pp. 13–21
  • A portion of Clausewitz’s letter to Roeder, December 22, 1827 (This is an obscure, rarely discussed exposition of Clausewitz’s thoughts, particularly relating to the topic of this lesson. Your understanding of the Clausewitzian understanding of the relationship between war and politics [and therefore of that question itself] is apt to be partial if you don’t read this letter.)
• Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945, pp. 180–92
  • An important brief overview of the history in question.
• Helmuth von Moltke, “War and Politics,” Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings, ed. Daniel J. Hughes, pp. 35–6
• Helmuth von Moltke, “On Strategy, 1871,” in Moltke on the Art of War, pp. 44–47

Major General (Ret.) Mick Ryan

Mick Ryan is a retired major general in the Australian Army. He is now an adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC, and a non-resident fellow of the Lowy Institute in Sydney. In January 2023 Mick was also appointed as an Adjunct Professor at the University of Queensland in Brisbane, Australia.

Purpose:

Understand how changes in technology generated (required) transformations in military organization, doctrine, and theory.

Objectives: 

How does a revolutionary new technology change the conduct of war? And how does any large organization adopt a revolutionary new technology?

Readings: 

• Dennis Showalter, Railroads and Rifles, Part One (Railroads), pp. 19–72
  • This is a long, intricate history of a period you are not likely familiar with at all. But you have already read about Moltke—who he was, where he came from, and what he did—and you have read some of his own writing. You have also read a lot about the Napoleonic Wars and, particularly, the different lessons contemporaries drew from them. This reading should help you reflect on the challenges and opportunities offered to military theorists and practitioners by changing technology. How can one tell if a new technology might revolutionize warfare? How can one guess about how to use that technology to do so? How do military requirements interact with economic needs to shape the evolution of both military and civilian technology? What role do individuals play in generating disjunctive change?
• Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan and Col. James M. Dubik, Envisioning Future Warfare, 1995
• James M. Dubik, The Army’s Twofer: The Dual Role of the Interim Force, October 2001
• Gen (Ret) Gordon Sullivan and Col (Ret) Michael Harper, Hope is Not a Method, pp. 9–21, 39–42, 49-54, 77–82, 147–49, 155–71, 182–87, and 236–41
• Mick Ryan, War Transformed (Annapolis, MD; Naval Institute Press, 2022)

General David H. Petraeus

General (Ret.) David H. Petraeus currently serves as the Chairman of the KKR Global Institute at Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. He previously served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from September 2011 to November 2012. Prior to that, he commanded the United States Central Command from October 2008 to July 2011. He relinquished command of the Multi-National Force-Iraq after over 19 months at the helm of the Coalition force in Iraq.

Previous to his tour as MNF-I Commander, he commanded the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth. Before that assignment, he was the first commander of the Multi-national Security Transition Command-Iraq, which he led from June 2004 to September 2005, and the NATO Training Mission-Iraq, which he commanded from October 2004 to September 2005. That deployment to Iraq followed his command of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), during which he led the “Screaming Eagles” in combat throughout the first year of Operation Iraqi Freedom. His command of the 101st followed a year deployed on Operation Joint Forge in Bosnia, where he was the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations of the NATO Stabilization Force and the Deputy Commander of the US Joint Interagency   Counter-Terrorism Task Force-Bosnia. Prior to his tour in Bosnia, he spent two years at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, serving first as the Assistant Division Commander for Operations of the 82nd Airborne Division and then as the Chief of Staff of XVIII Airborne Corps.

Purpose:

• Decide which of the following are true:
  1. Trench warfare stalemate resulted from the stupidity of generals
  2. Stalemate was the inevitable result of the military technology of the time
  3. The German attack in 1914 failed because of Moltke’s changes to Schlieffen’s plan
  4. The 1914 attack failed because Schlieffen designed it mechanistically and in disregard of Moltke’s dictum that no plan survives first contact with the enemy
  5. The attack failed because Schlieffen sought Napoleonic-style decisive victories in an era in which they were no longer possible
• Why did the war stalemate on the Western Front?
• How did the various actors try to overcome the stalemate?

Readings:

• Terence Zuber, “1920: Kuhl Reveals the Schlieffen Plan,” German War Planning, 1891–1914, pp. 265–71
• Gunther Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 296–325
  • Another brilliant essay from one of the best compilations of writings about war ever produced. Pay careful attention—there are TWO Helmuth von Moltkes. You have been reading about Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, who introduced railway mobilization and the general staff system to the Prussian Army and led that army through the Wars of German Unification. Now you’ll meet his nephew, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, who will occupy his uncle’s position as Germany approaches and enters World War I. Use this essay to reflect on all of the theoretical and practical debates swirling between Clausewitz, Moltke the Elder, Jomini, and Schlieffen about the nature of war as art, science, or a hybrid.
• James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of World War I, pp. 22–56 (through the First Marne). Recommended as overview; not required—but make sure you understand what happened in 1914 through the First Battle of the Marne.
• Terence Zuber, “The ‘Schlieffen’ Plan,” German War Planning, 1891–1914, pp. 187–204 (Read closely and with a map).
  • This is the closest we can get to the “Schlieffen Plan,” which was destroyed along with most of the documents relating to Germany’s pre- war planning in a vain attempt to absolve Germany of responsibility for the war. This is NOT the actual plan, however. It is a concept of operations, and a preliminary one. Understand how it was supposed to work. Try to identify logical gaps and potential problems within this document. Then reflect on how much Moltke the Younger was to blame for the “failure” of the “Schlieffen Plan.” Finally, think about what this debate says about the nature of war.
• Timothy Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1981.
  • This is the only reading this lesson that describes the nature and challenges of trench warfare— understanding that is more important than mastering the details of infiltration tactics.

Videos:

• Trench Warfare
• German Tactics for 1918 Spring Offensive | The Great War Special
• Tank Development in World War I | The Great War Special

Purpose:

Understand the evolution of operational art as a distinct branch of military theory and practice.

Objectives:

Learning from success and failure: How did the combatants of WWI try to envision the next war and adapt their forces to fight it?

Readings:

“Coping with Trench-Warfare Stalemate”

This block is absolutely pivotal for understanding the evolution of armored warfare, so do not skip it. Make sure that you read the Lupfer without fail. If we do not get to it today, then skim to refresh your memory on it during the reading day tomorrow so that you have it in your mind after reading day.

• David Glantz, Chs. 2, 4, and 5, “The Nature of Operational Art,” “The Formative Years of Soviet Operational Art,” and “The Great Patriotic War and the Maturation of Operational,” Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle, (New York: Frank Cass, 1991)
  • Make sure you get to this reading. The Germans took armored warfare and operational art one way—the Soviets took it somewhere rather different. Make sure you can sense the differences.
• J. F. C. Fuller, “The Application of Recent Developments In Mechanics And Other Scientific Knowledge To Preparation And Training For Future War On Land,” Gold Medal (Military) Prize Essay in the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 1919
• J. F. C. Fuller, “Plan 1919”
• Michael Geyer, Ch. 19, “German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914–1945,” in Makers of Modern Strategy
• Robert M. Citino, Quest for Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe, 1899–1940
  • Second half of Ch. 6, “The Interwar Years,” pp. 193–213 (from “Germany: Doctrine and Developments) as well as Ch. 8, “Operational Art Reborn,” pp. 251–83
• Robert Doughty, Chs. 1, 5, and Conclusion, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919–39

Videos:

• What was the Blitzkrieg? The Blitzkrieg Explained as Short as Possible
• Weaponology – “Blitzkrieg”
• Blitzkrieg in the West – The Invasion of France, WWII, May 18, 1940

Morning

General (Ret.) Stanley McChrystal

Gen. McChrystal is the former commander of US and International Security Assistance Forces Afghanistan and the nation’s premier military counter-terrorism force, Joint Special Operations Command. He is best known for developing and implementing a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, and for creating a cohesive counter-terrorism organization that revolutionized the interagency operating culture.

Reading:

• Stanley McChrystal, My Share of the Task, pp. 89–263
  • Students should begin this reading, focusing on the narrative of the creation of the Joint Special Operations Task Force and reflecting on how the principles embodied in that organization reflect the theories and history articulated in other lessons.

Afternoon

Purpose:

Understand the terms and concepts of air power theory as it evolved from early in the 20th century to the present.

Objectives:

The search for a silver bullet: Can we fight by air alone?

• Understand the rationale for seeing airpower as fundamentally revolutionary in the first half of the 20th century
• Evaluate the nature of the debate over the right relationship between airpower and other forms of military power in that time
• Master the concept of “center of gravity” as it is used in the context of airpower theory
• Compare and contrast the airpower view of the enemy (and how to operate against him) with the view presented by operational art theory
• Consider both operational art and airpower theory in the context of nonlinearity, complexity, and chaos theory.

Readings:

• David Deptula, “Defining Rapid Decisive Operations: Parallel Warfare,” in Effects Based Operations: Changes in the Nature of War, pp. 3–7
• David MacIsaac, Ch. 21, “Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 624–47.
• John Warden, The Air Campaign (entire)
  • This is a long reading, but students should focus on Chs. 1, 2, 10, and “The Air Campaign in Retrospect.”
• NOT REQUIRED BUT FOR YOUR FUTURE EXPLORATION: John F. Boyd’s briefings are available at https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_0151_Boyd_Discourse_Winning_Losing.PDF
  • These readings are seminal works shaping the evolution of American airpower theory—and, thus, of the world’s airpower theory. The required papers are:
    • 5 – Abstract
    • 42 – Pattern
    • 43 – The Strategic Game of ? and ?
    • 45 – Winning and losing

Videos:

• Victory Through Air Power: Animated History of Aviation (1942)
• Airpower in WWI
• Tactical and Strategic Power in WWII
• Airpower in the Korean War
• Airpower in Vietnam

LTG (Ret.) H.R. McMaster

LTG McMaster served as a commissioned officer in the United States Army for thirty-four years before retiring as a Lieutenant General in June 2018. From 2014 to 2017 McMaster designed the future army as the director of the Army Capabilities Integration Center and the deputy commanding general of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). As commanding general of the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, he oversaw all training and education for the army’s infantry, armor, and cavalry force. Most recently, McMaster published, “Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World.”

Purpose:

The wars we want to fight: how the U.S. prepared for, won, and learned from the Gulf War.

Objectives:

1. Understand the American theory and practice of conventional warfare at the end of the 20th
2. Examine different approaches to the problem of designing military doctrine based on observation of contemporary wars and the study of adversary intentions and theory.
3. Evaluate competing explanations for the outcome of the first Gulf War and their implications for the future of American war-fighting.
4. Consider the continuities and discontinuities of warfare over many changes in technology throughout the 20th
5. Evaluate the nature of the debate over the right relationship between airpower and other forms of military power
6. Contrast the experience of the Gulf War with the other U.S. military deployments of the 1990s

Readings:

• Douglas W. Skinner, Airland Battle Doctrine, September 1998
• John Warden, Epilogue, The Air Campaign
• Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Summary Report, pp. 1–27, (“What happened?”), and 235–53 (“Was Desert Storm a Revolution in Warfare?”), Gulf War Air Power Survey
• Stephen Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict,” 1996
• H.R. McMaster, “Eagle Troop, Second Squadron, Second Armored Cavalry Regiment,” The Bridge, February 26, 2016
• H.R. McMaster, “What We Learned: from the Battle of 73 Easting”
  • Stephen D. Biddle, Commentary on “Victory Misunderstood
• Max Boot, Chs. 14 and 16 (“In the Shadow of Vietnam” and “In Defense of Pax Americana”), The Savage Wars of Peace

Videos:

• The 1st Gulf War, Battle of 73 Easting
• Airpower in the 1st Gulf War

Purpose:

Understand how state adversaries have attempted to circumvent U.S. conventional superiority.

Objectives:

• How does the Russian military system differ from NATO and Ukraine? What are the strengths and weaknesses of that system?
• What are the key causes of the current course of the war in Ukraine?

Readings:

• Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, “Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force-Design,” War on the Rocks, June 2, 2022
• Seth Jones, “Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine,” CSIS, June 2022
• Isabelle Khurshudyan, Paul Sonne, Serhiy Morgunov and Kamila Hrabchuk, “Inside the Ukrainian counteroffensive that shocked Putin and reshaped the war,” Washington Post, December 29, 2022
• Liam Collins, Michael Kofman, and John Spencer, “The Battle of Hostomel Airport: A Key Moment in Russia’s Defeat in Kyiv,” War on the Rocks, August 10, 2023
• Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defences in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive,” Royal United Services Institute, September 2023
• Nataliya Bugayova, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan, “Weakness is Lethal: Why Putin Invaded Ukraine and How the War Must End,” Institute for the Study of War, October 1, 2023
• Mason Clark and Karolina Hird, “Russian Regular Ground Forces Order of Battle,” Institute for the Study of War, October 2023
• Frederick W. Kagan, Kateryna Stepanenko, Mitchell Belcher, Noel Mikkelsen, and Thomas Bergeron, “The High Price of Losing Ukraine: Part 1 — Military-Strategic & Financial Implications of Russian Victory,” Institute for the Study of War, December 14, 2023
• Frederick W. Kagan, George Barros, Noel Mikkelsen, and Daniel Mealie, “The Lands Ukraine Must Liberate,” Institute for the Study of War, December 31, 2023
• Nataliya Bugayova and Frederick W. Kagan with Kateryna Stepanenko, “Denying Russia’s Only Strategy for Success,” Institute for the Study of War, March 27, 2024
• Karolina Hird, “The Kremlin’s Occupation Playbook: Coerced Russification and Ethnic Cleansing in Occupied Ukraine,” Institute for the Study of War, February 2024
• George Barros, “Putin’s Safe Space: Defeating Russia’s Kharkiv Operation Requires Eliminating Russia’s Sanctuary,” Institute for the Study of War, May 13, 2024
• Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan, “Why Putin Remains Uninterested in Meaningful Negotiations with Ukraine,” Institute for the Study of War, June 14, 2024
• Jack Watling, Oleksandr V. Danylyuk, and Nick Reynolds, “Preliminary Lessons from Ukraine’s Offensive Operations, 2022–23,” Royal United Services Institute, July 2024
• Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan with Mason Clark, Karolina Hird, Nataliya Bugayova, Kateryna Stepanenko, and George Barros, “Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War,” Institute for the Study of War, August 2024
• Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments, Institute for the Study of War
  • Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan, “Ukrainian Counteroffensive Liberates Most of Kharkiv,” September 11, 2022
  • Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Madison Williams, Yekaterina Klepanchuk, Nicholas Carl, and Mason Clark, “Russia Withdraws across Dnipro River,” November 9, 2022
  • Riley Bailey and Kateryna Stepanenko, “Russian Command Changes,” April 30, 2023
  • Karolina Hird, “Russia’s Military Restructuring and Expansion Hindered by the Ukraine War,” November 12, 2023
  • Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan, “Putin’s Objectives,” December 14, 2023
  • Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan, “Putin’s Objectives,” December 17, 2023
  • Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, and George Barros, “Putin’s Theory of Victory,” June 7, 2024
  • Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, Nicole Wolkov, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan, “Putin’s Theory of Victory,” June 30, 2024
• [RECOMMENDED]: Mark Galeotti, Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine (Oxford, UK; Osprey Publishing, 2022)

Multimedia:

• Paul Sonne, Isabelle Khurshudyan, Serhiy Morgunov and Kostiantyn Khudov, “Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian valor, Russian blunders combined to save the capital,” Washington Post, August 24, 2022
• John Spencer, “The 2022 Battle of Kyiv: A Lecture,” Modern War Institute, April 14, 2023

Dan Blumenthal

Dan Blumenthal is the Director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, where he focuses on East Asian security issues and Sino-American relations. Mr. Blumenthal has both served in and advised the U.S. government on China issues for over a decade.

From 2001 to 2004, he served as senior director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia at the Department of Defense.  Additionally, he served as a commissioner on the congressionally-mandated U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission since 2006-2012, and held the position of vice chairman in 2007.  He has also served on the Academic Advisory Board of the congressional U.S.-China Working Group. Mr. Blumenthal is the coauthor of An Awkward Embrace: The United States and China in the 21st Century (AEI Press, November 2012).

He holds a B.A. from Washington University, an M.A. from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a J.D. from Duke Law School.

Purpose:

Understand how state adversaries have attempted to circumvent U.S. conventional superiority.

Objectives:

• What are the central ideas of Chinese military strategy? How does China’s way of war compare to that of other countries you have studied?
• How has China’s military strategy changed since the introduction of the 1993 Military Strategic Guidelines? What geopolitical conditions had the greatest impact on this strategic change?
• What impact do you believe PLA military modernization will have on the future of Chinese warfare?

Readings:

• Historical
  • Paul Godwin, “Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine, 1949-1999,” Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949 (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2003)
  • M. Taylor Fravel, Chs. 2 and 5, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy Since 1949 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019)
  • C.M. Paine, “Mao Zedong and Strategies of Nested War,” in The New Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 202)
  • [RECOMMENDED]: Larry Wortzel, “China’s Foreign Conflicts since 1949,” in A Military History of China (Louisville, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 2012)
• Modernization/Modern Way of War
  • M. Taylor Fravel, Ch. 6, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy Since 1949 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019)
  • Rush Doshi, Chs. 4 and 8, The Long Game (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2021)
  • Roderick Lee and Marcus Clay, “Don’t Call it a Gray Zone: China’s Use-of-Force Spectrum,” War on the Rocks
  • Dean Cheng “PLA Perspectives on Network Warfare in Informationized Local Wars,” US Congressional Testimony, February 17, 2022
  • US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023)
• Taiwain
  • Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan, “China’s Three Roads to Controlling Taiwan,” AEI
  • Andrew Krepinevich, “Archipelagic Defense 2.0,” Hudson Institute, September 2023

Further Discussion Questions:

1. Historical
   1. What was Mao’s strategy for revolution? What effect did the transition from guerilla tactics/mobile warfare to maneuver operations have on PLA campaign operations in the three major campaigns of the Chinese Civil War?
2. PRC Military Thinking Post-Korean War
   1. What is Active Defense? How does it differ from previous operational strategies used by the PLA? What impact might Active Defense have on the conduct of future wars?
   2. What do you see as the biggest changes in PLA strategy since the Chinese Civil War?
3. Political Warfare
   1. What is the Chinese conception of political warfare? What impact has it had on Chinese strategy?
4. Future
   1. What are the PLA strategies of informatization and intelligentization? What technological and strategic innovation would be necessary for the PLA to effectively enact either of these strategies in a future conflict?
   2. What new technologies do you think will have the biggest impact in a future war with China? How do you see China’s technological advancement impacting overall PLA force posture?
   3. China has not fought a war since 1979, and have thus closely studied the wars fought by other countries. What lessons from recent wars do you believe will have an impact on a potential future war over Taiwan?
   4. What is China’s “peacetime use of military force” strategy? What should the US and our allies do in response to this employment of force?

General (Ret.) John R. Allen

General (Ret.) Allen is a retired U.S. Marine Corps four-star general and former commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force, and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. Following his retirement, Allen served as advisor to the secretary of defense on Middle East Security and appointed as special presidential envoy to the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL by President Barack Obama. Allen is also the co-author of the book Turning Point: Policymaking in the Era of Artificial Intelligence.

Lieutenant General (Ret.) Michael Nagata

Michael K. Nagata is a Senior Vice President and Strategic Advisor for CACI International, and also owns and operates Hanada Bridge LLC, a national security and counterterrorism consulting firm.  Retiring from the US Army in 2019 after 38 years of active duty in the US Army, with 34 years in US Special Operations, his final assignment was Director of Strategic Operational Planning for the National Counterterrorism Center.

Purpose:

What have we learned?

Objectives:

• How can one intelligently speak about the future of war?
• What can the study of military history teach us?
• Key takeaways and conclusions.

Readings:

• H.R. McMaster, “The Pipe Dream of Easy War,” The New York Times, July 20, 2013
• Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” Royal United Services Institution Journal 107:625 (1962)
• John Allen, Frederick Ben Hodges, Julian Lindley-French, Future War and the Defence of Europe (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2021), “Scenario 1,” “Introduction,” “Could NATO (still) defend Europe?”, “Hyperwar: Europe’s digital and nuclear flanks,” and “Defending Europe”
• Mick Ryan, War Transformed (Annapolis, MD; Naval Institute Press, 2022) [review]