Lessons of the Cold War

This lesson will focus on two major themes.  First we will consider two opposing definitions of the Soviet threat that competed within the U.S. government in the first decade of the Cold War—George Kennan’s and that embodied in NSC-68, drafted under the leadership of Paul Nitze.  We will then explore the two conflicting grand strategies proposed by Kennan and NSC-68 and consider why Nitze’s ultimately prevailed.  We will move from this discussion to an assessment of the desirability of reconsidering Kennan’s rejected grand strategic approach in the current national security environment.

Readings: 

• George Kennan, “The Long Telegram,” 22 February 1946
• “X” (George Kennan), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947.
• Paul Nitze et al, NSC-68, “A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” 14 April 1950
• John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War, Revised and Expanded Edition, (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 1-197
  • Students should read the whole thing if they can, but certainly must read through p. 197.

This lesson will begin by examining the nature of the Soviet state from the Soviet perspective.  We will look at the origins and evolution of the Soviet Union, the Stalin period, and Soviet experiences during the Second World War (the Great Patriotic War) to understand the very different perspective Soviet leaders might have had on world affairs from their American counterparts.  We will consider how the Cold War appeared to the Soviets from its earliest days.  We will examine, briefly, Soviet ideology as it relates to war and international relations.

Readings: 

• Ronald J. Hill and Peter Frank, The Soviet Communist Party, 3^rd Edition, pp. 1-75
• William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, pp. 1-37
• Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev, Prologue, Chs. 1-2, 6, and 8
• Colonel B. Byely, Colonel Y. Dzyuba, et.al., Marxism-Leninism on War and Army, Ch. 1

This lesson will explore the origins and evolution of American thinking about atomic and nuclear war.  We will discuss the difference between atomic and thermonuclear weapons and the implications of that difference for thinking about nuclear war.  We will then consider the ways in which American nuclear theorists wrestled with the problem of thinking about how to wage nuclear war and, ultimately, about whether that question was even meaningful.

Readings: 

• Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” RAND, 6 November 1958
• Albert Wohlstetter and Henry Rowen, “Objectives of the United States Military Posture,” RAND, 1 May 1959
• Bernard Brodie, ed., Arnold Wolfers, Percy E. Corbett, and William T. R. Fox, The Absolute Weapon:  Atomic Power and World Order, Part I NB: This was General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s copy, and contains some marginalia.
• Bernard Brodie, “The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” International Security, vol. 2, no. 4 (Spring, 1978), pp. 65-83

This lesson will consider the Soviet approach to thinking about atomic and nuclear war.  It will contrast Soviet thought not only with American theory, but also with the understanding American theorists had about Soviet nuclear thinking.  We will discuss the dangers inherent in assuming common rationality with an opponent and how to identify and mitigate those dangers.  We will also consider the implications for deterrence of varying assessments of the feasibility of waging nuclear war.

Readings: 

• William R. Kintner and Harriet F. Scott, eds., The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs
• Major General K. S. Bokcharev, Colonel I. P. Prusanov, and Colonel A. A. Babokov, The Program of the CPSU on the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland [Published by the Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1965]. Kintner and Fast editors’ note and Ch. 2
• Colonel General Nikolai A. Lomov, “The Influence of Soviet Military Doctrine on the Development of Military Art,” pp. 153-169
• Marxism-Leninism on War and Army, Ch. 7, Section 1, “The Modern Revolution in Military Affairs and its Influence on the Military Potential,” pp. 250-261
• Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, 3^rd Edition, Ch. 4
• Fritz W. Ermarth, “Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought,” in Derek Leebaert, ed., Soviet Military Thinking
• Directorate of Intelligence, US Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Nuclear Doctrine: Concepts of Intercontinental and Theater War, 1973

We will end this course by examining current American and Russian doctrine and policy regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear war.  To what extent have Washington and Moscow converged on a common assessment of the feasibility of waging nuclear war or of waging limited nuclear war?  How well does American policy appear to understand Russian theories, policies, and doctrines?  How can we apply Cold War theories to the modern world in which multiple states maintain nuclear arsenals but are no longer aligned neatly into two camps?  Do they apply at all?

Readings: 

• US Department of Defense, “Nuclear Posture Review Report,” April 2010
• Russian military doctrine 2010
• William E. Odom, “Soviet Military Doctrine,” Foreign Affairs, Winter 1988/1989