War uses lives. It ends some and changes others forever. This is true not only for those who fight wars, but also for the innocent who get caught up in wars, the families and communities who send their loved ones to war, and the political community on whose behalf wars are fought and waged. War’s moral landscape involves all of this, and more.

There’s a lot to talk about. On one hand, understanding the moral landscape of war fully and completely is not possible in four days. On the other hand, we can describe the landscape and its “key terrain features” so that you can continue your study using a proper “map.” That’s all this course is designed to do: provide a framework of understanding that you can use to further your study.

We’ll start with one of war’s central features: killing and risking life. We’ll try to understand this aspect of war and its impact on those who return from war as well as on those awaiting their return. Then we’ll ask two basic question: (1) what justifies asking this much of one’s citizens-who-become soldiers (shorthand for sailors, marines, airmen); what justifies resort to the killing and destruction that occurs in war? (2) how can the killing and destruction be limited or contained—if it can?

War Studies Advanced Programs are open only to alumni of the basic War Studies course. These sessions are offered in the winter and summer, and focus either on a national security challenge or on a historical conflict. Learn more about the War Studies Program.

Image: The Battle of Atlanta, Atlanta, Georgia, 1886.

James Dubik on just war

Faculty

James M. Dubik

LTG James M. Dubik (U.S. Army, Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War and a Professor at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program. General Dubik has extensive operational experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, Japan, Korea, Thailand, Bosnia, Haiti, Panama, and in many NATO countries.

Frederick W. Kagan

Frederick W. Kagan is a Senior Instructor with the Hertog War Studies Program at the Institute for the Study of War. The author of the 2007 report “Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq,” he is one of the intellectual architects of the successful “surge” strategy in Iraq. He is the Director of AEI’s Critical Threats Project.

Kimberly Kagan

Kimberly Kagan is a Senior Instructor with the Hertog War Studies Program and founder and president of the Institute for the Study of War. She is a military historian who has taught at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Yale, Georgetown, and American University.

Preview the Syllabus by Week/Session

Readings:

  • LTC Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society.
  • Jonathan Shay, M.D., PhD: Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character. Chapters 1-3, 5-6, 9, 10-11.

 

Discussion Questions:
Afternoon

  1. What makes killing another human being so consequential, and how are those consequences made manifest? Can the “lack of enthusiasm” for killing or “the burden of killing” one’s fellow human being be overcome? All, part? How? How may distance be related to killing and its consequences?
  2. What is involved with the “massive unconscious cover-up”—“the actualities of war”—concerning the true nature of combat: individually and communally? Why is it “too painful for society to address what it does when it sends its young men and women” to war?
  3. What are the “psychological prices of war?” Who pays this price, how,
    when—what is “leader’s guilt” and why is this guilt paradoxical? How do the authors explain “war on the mind,” “fear of death,” the “weight of exhaustion,” and war’s “impact on the senses”? How do they explain PTSD? Of what does a soldier’s “well of fortitude” consist? How is it replenished, if it can be?
  4. How do Shay’s and Grossman’s accounts match? Where do they coincide? Where do they differ?

Readings:
Morning

  • Gregory A. Coco, A Strange and Blighted Land: Gettysburg and the Aftermath of a Battle. Chapters 1 and 2, and pages 149-189 of Chapter 3.
  • Nancy Sherman, Afterwar: Healing the Moral Wounds of Our Soldiers. The Prologue, Chapters 1-2 and 4-6.

Afternoon

  • Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. Part Two: The Theory of Aggression. Chapters 4-7. Walzer’s Legalist Paradigm and its exceptions.
  • Brian Orend, The Morality of War. Chapters 1-2. Just ad Bellum, resisting aggression in classical and non-classical wars.
  • George Weigel, “Moral Clarity in a Time of War,” First Things, January 2003.
  • OPTIONAL: Scan to pick up the overlap between the moral and legal perspectives.
    • Geoffrey S. Corn, et.al., The Law of Armed Conflict: An Operational Approach. Chapters 3-4. The Law of Armed Conflict: what triggers it, what are its principles and foundations.

 

Discussion Questions:
Morning

  1. How does Coco’s description of post-battle Gettysburg match Grossman’s and Shary’s account of war? Be specific: relate particular descriptions and passages to one another.
  2. In what ways is Sherman’s account different from Grossman’s and Shay’s? In what ways does Sherman build upon Grossman’s and Shay’s accounts? What is the difference between PTSD and “moral injury” for Sherman?
  3. What is “moral injury”? Who or what is injured? How? Why and in what ways are relationships so important in Sheman’s account? How can a returning soldier be both alive and dead? Can soldiers be “reborn,” if so how? How does Sherman define “resilience”? To whom does she apply the concept?
  4. How is Sherman’s “waves of resentment” related to Shay’s “betrayal,” if at all? Why is “thank you for your service” not enough? What is “enough”? How might Sherman describe the relationship between soldiers and the political community on whose behalf they fight? What obligations does each have to the other? Why, what is the source of this obligation?

Afternoon

  1. What is Walzer’s legalist paradigm? How does he argue for this paradigm? What are his exceptions, and why does he include these exceptions?
  2. What are Orend’s criteria for a just war? What is the difference, for Orend, between classical and non-classical war?
  3. In what ways do Walzer’s and Orend’s approach overlap? In what ways do they differ?
  4. What is Weigel’s approach to justifying ware? Is it substantially different from Walzer’s and Orend’s? If so, how and what difference does it make? If not, why not?

Readings:
Morning

  • Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. Part Three: The War Convention. Chapters 8-9. Part Four: Dilemmas of War. Chapters 14 and 16. Part Five: The Question of Responsibility. Chapters 18-19.
  • Brian Orend, The Morality of War. Chapters 4-5. Conduct in war.

OPTIONAL: Scan sufficiently to pick up the overlap between the moral and legal perspectives.

  • Geoffrey S. Corn, et.al., The Law of Armed Conflict: An Operational Approach. Chapters 5-10 and 13-14. The law governing the conduct of war, command responsibility, and compliance mechanisms.

Afternoon

  • James M. Dubik, Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory. The Prologue and Chapters 1-2, and 6. Jus in bello’s war-waging dimension.

 

Discussion Questions:
Morning

  • What is Walzer’s War Convention? How does he argue for it? Upon what assumptions does his position rest? Are these assumptions all stated? If so, be prepared to describe them. If not, be prepared to fill in what they are.
  • What is Walzer’s “theory of responsibility?” How do you assess the completeness and accuracy of this theory?
  • What parts of Walzer’s position does Orend accept? What parts does he modify or change?

Afternoon

  • What is the gap in jus in bello that Dubik claims to have found? What does this gap matter? If it does, explain how. If it doesn’t, explain why. How does Dubik fill that gap?
  • The principles that govern jus in bello’s strategic dimension are different from those Walzer and Orend say govern war’s tactical dimension. How and why do they differ? Are these principles solely moral principles? If so, why? If not, what does that mean, if anything?
  • What is the relationship, if any, between Shay’s concept of “betrayal,” and Dubik’s ideas on the four important, morally relevant relationships? How might Sherman assess Dubik’s four relationships?

Readings:
Morning

  • Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime. Chapters 1, 6-7. Understanding the unequal dialogue.
  • Peter Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations. Chapters 1, 3-4.
  • James M. Dubik, Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory. Chapters 3-5.
  • Matthew Moten, Presidents & Their Generals: An American History of Command in War. Introduction and Conclusion.

Afternoon

  • No further readings.

 

Discussion Questions:
Morning

  1. What is Walzer’s War Convention? How does he argue for it? Upon what
    assumptions does his position rest? Are these assumptions all stated? If so, be prepared to describe them. If not, be prepared to fill in what they are.
  2. What is Walzer’s “theory of responsibility?” How do you assess the completeness and accuracy of this theory?
  3. What parts of Walzer’s position does Orend accept? What parts does he modify or change?

Afternoon

  1. What is the gap in jus in bello that Dubik claims to have found? What does this gap matter? If it does, explain how. If it doesn’t, explain why. How does Dubik fill that gap?
  2. The principles that govern jus in bello’s strategic dimension are different from those Walzer and Orend say govern war’s tactical dimension. How and why do they differ? Are these principles solely moral principles? If so, why? If not, what does that mean, if anything?
  3. What is the relationship, if any, between Shay’s concept of “betrayal,” and Dubik’s ideas on the four important, morally relevant relationships? How might Sherman assess Dubik’s four relationships?

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