An examination of what it means to command at the very highest levels of war, focusing on the U.S. military experience from World War I until today. The course will use the case-study method to draw out lessons about the nature of command at the theater level, and how it has changed over the past 110 years.

The framing construct for the course will be the change in the U.S. military from a small constabulary force on the eve of the First World War to the establishment of the national security state and a large standing military following the end of the Second World War, and the long struggle with the Soviet Union that ensued. Against this backdrop, we will examine how senior military leaders dealt with operational, strategic, diplomatic, technological, and political issues.

Image: USCENTCOM commander visits FOB North in Egypt

Gen. McKenzie on Afghanistan, Iran, & China

This course is part of our residential Security Studies Program. Fellows participate in morning seminars and meet national security leaders and experts over afternoon and evening sessions. Up to 16 fellows will be selected.

Faculty

Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.

Gen. Kenneth ‘Frank’ McKenzie Jr. is the former Commander of United States Central Command. He led a distinguished 42-year military career, commanding at multiple levels within the Marine Corps and serving on the Joint Staff. His leadership roles included commanding the First Battalion, Sixth Marines, and the 22nd MEU (SOC) during combat deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq.

Gen. Kenneth ‘Frank’ McKenzie Jr.

Gen. Kenneth ‘Frank’ McKenzie Jr. is the former Commander of United States Central Command. He led a distinguished 42-year military career, commanding at multiple levels within the Marine Corps and serving on the Joint Staff. His leadership roles included commanding the First Battalion, Sixth Marines, and the 22nd MEU (SOC) during combat deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. As a Brigadier General, he contributed to wartime administration transitions and later helped shape strategic policies for the U.S. Central Command and the Marine Corps. Promoted to General in 2019, McKenzie took command of CENTCOM, a role he held until his retirement from the Marine Corps in April 2022.

General McKenzie currently serves as the Executive Director of the University of South Florida’s Global and National Security Institute and Executive Director of the Florida Center for Cybersecurity, also known as Cyber Florida.

 

Preview the Syllabus by Week/Session

Readings:

  • Lawrence Freedman, “Introduction: Command as Politics,” Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine (New York, Oxford University Press: 2022), 1–13
  • “Higher Command in War: Field Marshal Sir William Slim (1891–1970)” Military Review, May-June 2020
  • Charlie Dunlap, “Yes, the Law of Military Orders Matters, and Here’s How,” Lawfire, November 2024
  • “Defense Primer: Military Officers,” Version 17, Congressional Research Service, November 2024
  • Peter Singer, “Tactical Generals: Leaders, Technology, and the Perils,” Brookings Institution, July 2009
  • John Keegan, Introduction, “Pre-Heroic Leadership,” The Mask of Command: A Study of Generalship (Viking, 1987), pp. 1–11
  • Keegan, Excerpt on Alexander the Great, The Mask of Command, 87–91
  • Keegan, 2, “Wellington: The Anti-Hero,” The Mask of Command, pp. 92–103, 154–163
  • Keegan, 3, “Grant and Unheroic Leadership,” The Mask of Command, pp. 164–233
  • Keegan, Conclusion, “Post Heroic: Command in the Nuclear World,” The Mask of Command, 311–51

Discussion Questions:

  1. How do we analyze generalship? Are there consistent standards that can be established?
  2. How has generalship evolved over time? Are there consistent personal traits and characteristics that identify successful generals in any age?
  3. Is generalship in the United States unique? What sets it apart from many other countries?
  4. What is the relationship between senior military leaders and the nation’s civilian leaders? How has it changed over time?

 

Readings:

  • Francoise Le Roy and Drew Perkins, Ch. 6, “Visionary Leadership: Henry ‘Hap’ Arnold,” The Art of Command: Military Leadership from George Washington to Colin Powell, eds. Harry S. Laver and Jeffrey J. Matthews (University Press of Kentucky: 2008), pp 157–79
  • David Alan Rosenberg and Harry S. Laver, Ch. 8, “Innovative Leadership: Arleigh Burke,” The Art of Command, pp. 223–47
  • Thomas Alexander Hughes, 16, “Bull’s Run,” Admiral Bill Halsey: A Naval Life (Harvard University Press: 2016) pp. 352–75
  • Michael Carver, “Fleet Admiral William Halsey,” The War Lords (Pen & Sword Military Classics: 2005), pp. 431–46
  • Carver, “Admiral Raymond A. Spruance,” The War Lords, 447–60
  • Carver, “General Carl Spaatz,” The War Lords, pp. 568–81

Discussion Questions:

  1. Why is it hard to anticipate?
  2. How do generals anticipate (or fail to anticipate) future challenges in an environment of evolving technology, shifting human geography, and unexpected events?
  3. Why are military organizations inherently conservative, and how have successful innovators overcome this inertia?
  4. Does genuine change need to be imposed from an external source? Can meaningful change be generated internally?

Readings:

  • Freedman, 1, “Supreme Commander: Truman and MacArthur,” Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine, pp. 15–29
  • Robert Heinl, “The Inchon Landing: A Case Study in Amphibious Planning,” Naval War College, 1998, pp. 117–34
  • Kenneth McKenzie, Ch. 2, “Central Command,” The Melting Point: High Command and War in the 21st Century (La Vergne: Naval Institute Press: 2024) pp. 9–26
  • McKenzie, 3, “Confronting Iran,” The Melting Point, pp. 27–39
  • Mark Perry, 4, “Coup D’ Etat,” Four Stars (Houghton Mifflin: 1989), pp. 95–131
  • Larry I. Bland, Ch. 3, “Institutional Leadership: George C. Marshall,” The Art of Command: Military Leadership from George Washington to Colin Powell, pp. 63–93
  • Kerry E. Irish, Ch. 4, “Cross-Cultural Leadership: Dwight Eisenhower,” The Art of Command, pp. 95–126
  • Thomas G. Bradbeer, Ch. 7, “Transitional Leadership: Matthew Ridgway,” The Art of Command, pp. 181–222
  • Jeffrey J. Matthews, Ch. 11, “Exemplary Followership: Colin Powell,” The Art of Command, pp. 305–38
  • Carver, “Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz,” The War Lords, pp. 404–18

Discussion Questions:

  1. In War and Peace, Tolstoy argues against the importance of individual agency in warfare. He proposes that structural and other factors ultimately The Marxists largely agree. Agree or disagree?
  2. How can a commander craft a vision and impose it on an organization? Is it best done in peace or war?
  3. What’s more important – the personality or the idea? Can one survive without the other?
  4. The price of failure is very high in Is this a factor in limiting boldness in commanders?

Readings:

  • Dean Ludwig and Clinton O. Longenecker, “The Bathsheba Syndrome: The Ethical Failure of Successful Leaders,” Journal of Business Ethics, pp. 265–73
  • Thomas E. Ricks, Ch. 15, “Maxwell Taylor: Architect of Defeat,” The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today (Penguin Press: 2012) 217–30
  • Ricks, 16, “William Westmoreland: The Organization Man in Command,” The Generals, pp. 231–40

Discussion Questions:

  1. Are generals uniquely sensitive to corruption and misbehavior, because of their all- encompassing authority?
  2. How might the hierarchical nature of the military and deference to rank affect the advice a commander receives from his/her staff or subordinate commanders? How do you create an environment where respectful disagreement is encouraged?
  3. Successful commanders typically possess a very large Can this be subordinated to decision-making?
  4. How can commanders arrange overlapping allegiances – their specific organization, their branch, their service, the overall strategic objectives, their country, their personal beliefs and value system?

Readings:

  • Lawrence Freedman, “The Age of Forever Wars: Why Military Strategy No Longer Delivers Victory,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2025
  • Freedman, Ch. 16, “Past, Present and Future of Command,” Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine (Oxford University Press: 2022) pp. 491-515
  • McKenzie, 4, “Finishing Baghdadi,” The Melting Point, pp. 40–61
  • McKenzie, 5, “Soleimani,” The Melting Point, pp. 63–89
  • McKenzie, 6, “Aftermath,” The Melting Point, pp. 90–99
  • McKenzie, 8, “Drawing Down the Long War in Afghanistan,” The Melting Point, pp. 111–45
  • McKenzie, 11, “The Noose Tightens in Afghanistan,” The Melting Point, pp. 183– 211
  • McKenzie, 16, “Considering Phlebas,” The Melting Point, pp. 279–302

Discussion Questions:

  1. In the Baghdadi raid, the central question was about the collateral damage that was acceptable to the CENTCOM Was that a reasonable criterion for deciding the nature of the attack?
  2. In the Soleimani strike, did we (the U.S.) assume an unreasonable level of risk by striking a key Iranian military leader? “Was the game worth the candle?”
  3. In the Afghanistan withdrawal, should senior military leaders have resigned after their advice wasn’t taken?
  4. How can generals avoid confirmation bias in planning and execution?
  5. To paraphrase Clausewitz, the logic of future warfare probably will not change, but its grammar will. How do we prepare for this inevitable development?

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Biography Image

H.R. McMaster

H. R. McMaster is the Fouad and Michelle Ajami Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.  Previously, he served as the 26th assistant to the president for National Security Affairs and as a commissioned officer in the United States Army for 34 years before retiring as a Lieutenant General. He is author of Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World.