U.S.-China Strategic Competition

Assigned Reading:

• Gordon S. Barrass, Chapter Five: “U.S. Competitive Strategy During The Cold War,” from Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice, 2012, pp. 71–89
• Andrew Marshall and James Roche, “Strategy for Competing with the Soviets in the Military Sector of the Continuing Political-Military Competition,” 1976, pp. 1–37

Discussion Questions:

1. We are in a competition with China, Iran, and Russia. We compete in order to win. What does winning the competition mean?
2. What do we need to understand about ourselves in order to develop an appropriate strategy for competing with China, Iran, and Russia?
3. What can we learn from our most recent great power competition with the Soviet Union that is relevant to our current competition?

Assigned Reading:

• Michael Green, By More Than Providence: Grand Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783,  2017, pp. 56–115, 323–63

Discussion Questions:

1. Did the U.S. have a strategic concept for the Far East before the Spanish-American War?
2. Was war with Japan inevitable? Why/why not?
3. Was the Vietnam War a strategic error? Why or why not?
4. Was Nixon/Kissinger’s strategic concept correct?
5. Is the U.S. an Asian power?

Assigned Reading:

• Margaret MacMillan, “The Polar Bear,” Nixon & Mao: The Week That Changed the World (2007), 124–45
• Chen Jian, Excerpts from “The Sino-American Rapprochement, 1969–1972,” Mao’s China and the Cold War (2001)
• MacMillan, “Meeting with Mao,” “Audience Reactions,” and “The Shanghai Communiqué,” Nixon & Mao: The Week That Changed the World (2007)
• Hal Brands, What Good Is Grand Strategy? (2014), 59–101

Discussion Questions:

1. What was President Nixon’s initial approach to China upon taking office in January 1969? What was the Soviet approach? How did each relate its China strategy to its Cold War strategy?
2. What was the Shanghai Communiqué, and what did it achieve? How does it compare to the objectives of the key players at the beginning of U.S.-China negotiations?
3. Who emerged as winners and losers post-negotiations? How do you judge the performance of the key decision-makers in Washington and Beijing?

Assigned Reading:

• Aaron Friedberg, “Competing with China,” Survival, Vol. 60, Issue 3 (2018), pp. 7–64

Discussion Questions:

1. Why did it take so long for the U.S. to “wake up” to the China problem?
2. What caused us to finally “wake up” when we did?
3. Was there an alternative to the “engaging and balancing” strategy of the last generation? If so, what was it?

Assigned Reading:

• “Full text of Xi Jinping’s report at 19th CPC National Congress,” Xinhua, October 17, 2017, pp. 1–23
• John Garnaut, “Engineers of the Soul: Ideology in Xi Jinping’s China,” Sinocism, January 16, 2019
• Tanner Greer, “Xi Jinping in Translation: China’s Guiding Ideology,” Palladium Magazine, May 31, 2019
• Skim: Susan Lawrence and Michael Martin, “Understanding China’s Political System,” CRS Report R41007, January 31, 2013

Discussion Questions:

1. Chinese leaders are often hailed for their long-term planning and commitment to the plan. What factors in Chinese politics bolster or hinder such planning?
2. What is the “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation” and how does the Chinese Communist Party intend to achieve it?
3. What observations can be made between the Chinese Communist Party’s organizational structure and its objectives and methods?

Assigned Reading:

• Liu Xiaobo, “Liu Xiaobo on China’s Quest for Democracy: An Introduction”(and his two essays), Journal of Democracy, Volume 22, Number 1, January 2011
• Elizabeth Economy, “30 Years After Tiananmen: Dissent is not Dead,” Journal of Democracy, Volume 30, Number 2, April 2019
• Xiao Qiang, “The Road to Digital Unfreedom: President Xi’s Surveillance State,” Journal of Democracy, Volume 30, Number 1, January 2019
• Sarah Cook, “The Battle for China’s Spirit: Religious Revival, Repression, and Resistance under Xi Jinping,”  Freedom House Special Report, February 2017, p. 1–11
• Samantha Hoffman, “Social Credit: Technology-enhanced authoritarian control with global consequences,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Policy Brief, Report No. 6/2018
• Simon Tisdall, “The Chinese Export We Really Should be Worried About: Repression,” The Guardian, November 23, 2018

Discussion Questions:

1. With the benefit of hindsight, what were the main misapprehensions regarding the long-standing assumptions about the presumed benefits of deep engagement with China?
2. Under the CCP’s guidance, China is in the process of becoming – or perhaps already is – a tech superpower. Do the U.S. and other democracies sufficiently understand the ways in which the Chinese authorities use technology for purposes of domestic control – and the potential wider implications of China operating from a privileged position in the tech realm?
3. In what ways does China’s internal governance arrangement and CCP control inform and animate China’s external behavior?