

**Summer Courses, Summer 2018**  
**NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND WORLD ORDER**  
**Instructor: Eric S. Edelman**  
**Washington, DC**

Are we entering a dangerous new age of nuclear proliferation? A world in which the use of nuclear weapons is truly imaginable or even likely? And do the democratic nations of the world have a strategy to preserve order and protect themselves in this brave new world?

This one-week course will explore the ways nuclear weapons transformed the world we inhabit today, the effects of nuclear weapons on the conduct of international politics, and the challenges that multipolar nuclear competition and the rise of new technologies present for nuclear deterrence. Through background readings and discussion of case studies, students will gain the historical, strategic, and theoretical background necessary to allow them to understand and assess the key debates and policies regarding nuclear weapons that the United States will likely face in the coming decades.

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## **Monday, June 11, 2018**

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### **9:00 a.m. to Noon Introduction: Nuclear Deterrence & Extended Deterrence in the First Nuclear Age**

#### **Readings:**

- Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2008), pp. 26–59
- Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice* (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1961), pp. 10–58
- Evan Braden Montgomery, *Extended Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age*, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2015), pp. 1–37
- Timothy W. Crawford, “The Endurance of Extended Deterrence: Continuity, Change, and Complexity in Theory and Policy,” in Paul, Morgan and Wirtz, *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), pp. 277–99

#### **Discussion Questions:**

1. What is deterrence, and what is necessary for it to work?
2. How much is enough for effective deterrence?
3. What is extended deterrence, and how do alliance commitments complicate credible deterrent threats?
4. How does the “Second Nuclear Age” differ from the first? What new (and old) challenges does the U.S. face?
5. Is the current U.S. approach to extended nuclear deterrence likely to remain adequate? If not, how might the U.S. adapt its extended nuclear deterrence posture to preserve stability across the regions that concern it most?

**Noon to 1:00 p.m.**

**Group Lunch**

**1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m.**

**Guest Speaker**

**Hal Brands**, professor, Johns Hopkins SAIS and Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

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**Tuesday, June 12, 2018**

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**9:00 a.m. to Noon**    **The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime & US Grand Strategy since 1945**

**Readings:**

- Memorandum for President Kennedy, February 16, 1963
- Francis J. Gavin, "Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation," *International Security*, 40:1, pp. 9–46
- Hal Brands, "Rethinking Nonproliferation: LBJ, the Gilpatric Committee, and U.S. National Security Policy," *The Journal of Cold War Studies*, 8:2, pp. 82–113
- Matthew Kroenig, "U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation: Is There a Link?" *Journal of Peace Research*, 53:2, pp. 166–79

**Discussion Questions:**

1. Why does the U.S. have a strong national interest in preventing nuclear proliferation?
2. Does nuclear proliferation produce stability or instability in the international system?
3. What is the relationship between proliferation and arms control?
4. Should states try to eliminate nuclear weapons or control their spread? What would be the best strategy to prevent nuclear proliferation?

**Noon to 1:00 p.m.**

**Group Lunch**

**1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m.**

**Guest Speaker**

**Matthew Kroenig**, professor, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University

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**Wednesday, June 13, 2018**

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**9:00 a.m. to Noon**    **Multipolar Nuclear Competition & Scenarios for Nuclear Weapons Use in the Second Nuclear Age**

**Readings:**

- Andrew Krepinevich, *Critical Mass: Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East*, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013), pp. 33–60
- Andrew Krepinevich and Jacob Cohn, *Rethinking Armageddon: Scenario Planning in the Second Nuclear Age*, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2016), pp. 10–22 and 65–81

- Vipin Narang, “Nuclear Strategies of Emerging Nuclear Powers: North Korea and Iran,” *The Washington Quarterly*, 38:1, pp. 73–91
- Narang, “Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation: How States Pursue the Bomb,” *International Security*, 41:3, pp. 110–50

### **Recommended Reading:**

- Narang, “What Does it Take to Deter?: Regional Power, Nuclear Postures and International Conflict,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 57:3, pp. 478–508

### **Discussion Questions:**

1. What are the distinctive security challenges of nuclear multipolarity?
2. What does “strategic stability” mean in a multipolar nuclear world?
3. Can a state deter, and if necessary fight, nuclear wars with multiple nuclear-armed adversaries?
4. How and why do nuclear weapons spread? What strategies can we expect emerging nuclear powers to adopt (Iran, North Korea)?

**Noon to 1:00 p.m.**

**Group Lunch**

**1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m.**

**Guest Speaker**

**Ray Takeyh**, senior fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

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**Thursday, June 14, 2018**

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**9:00 a.m. to Noon Disruptive Technologies & the Renewed Prospects for “Limited” Nuclear War**

### **Readings:**

- Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence,” *International Security*, 41:4, pp. 9–49
- Stephen J. Cimbala, “Nuclear Deterrence and Cyber Warfare: Coexistence or Competition?” *Defense and Security Analysis*, 33:3, pp. 193–208
- Speier, Nacouzi, Lee, and Moore, *Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), pp. 7–19
- Kareem Ayoub and Kenneth Payne, “Strategy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 39:5–6; pp. 793–819
- Matthew Kroenig and Tristan Volpe, “3-D Printing the Bomb? The Nuclear Nonproliferation Challenge,” *The Washington Quarterly*, 38:3, pp. 7–19
- Thomas C. Mahnken, “Future Scenarios of Limited Nuclear Conflict,” in Larsen and Kartchner, *On Limited Nuclear War in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford U. Press, 2014) pp. 129–43

- Bruce Bennett, “On U.S. Preparedness for Limited Nuclear War,” in Larsen and Kartchner, pp. 211–41

## Discussion Questions:

1. What are the implications of new technologies—e.g., precision and hypersonic weapons, antimissile defense, cyber-attack capabilities, and artificial intelligence—for nuclear deterrence?
2. Is nuclear deterrence more stable if human beings are in or out of the decision-making loop?
3. What is “limited” nuclear war? What are the different scenarios under which a limited nuclear strike might occur?
4. What can the U.S. do to deter limited nuclear attacks by adversaries?

**Noon to 1:00 p.m.**

**Group Lunch**

**1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m.**

**Guest Speaker**

**Amb. Robert Joseph**, senior scholar, National Institute for Public Policy

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## Friday, June 15, 2018

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**9:00 a.m. to Noon**

**Crisis Simulation**

*Simulation Leaders: **Christopher Griffin**, U.S. Army National Guard  
**Evan Montgomery**, senior fellow, CSBA*

**Noon to 3:00 p.m.**

**Group Lunch & Closing Discussion**

## **Suggested Background Reading**

*(Available electronically and in hard copy upon request)*

### *General*

1) U.S. Department of Defense, 2018 National Defense Strategy and the Nuclear Posture Review

2) Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Opening Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, January 25, 2018

3) General (ret.) Kevin Chilton, "On U.S. Nuclear Deterrence," *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Winter 2017

4) Scott Sagan, "The Korean Missile Crisis," *Foreign Affairs* 96:6, November/December 2017

5) Paul Bracken, *The Second Nuclear Age*, 2012

6) Edward Geist and Andrew Lohn, *How Might Artificial Intelligence Affect the Risk of Nuclear War?*, RAND Corp., April 2018