



## COURSE SCHEDULE 2016

Lessons are day-long; some are divided into two blocks when they address different topics.

**Blue** lessons will be held offsite.

**Yellow** entries are weekend dates.

### Lesson 1, Saturday, July 16: Language and logic of war

*Objectives:*

1. *Learn the basic vocabulary needed to discuss war and military operations*
2. *Understand how to read military maps and symbols*
  - U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Chapter 1, "Theory and Foundations"
  - Kagan readings (in course packet)
  - Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis*, pp. 3-43 (esp. 17-34)
  - U.S. Department of the Army, Army Field Manual 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, [http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR\\_pubs/dr\\_a/pdf/fm1\\_02.pdf](http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm1_02.pdf)
    - Definitions of tactical terms, pp. 15ff;
    - Tactical mission graphics, Appendix A-1, p. 435ff.
  - <http://www.westpoint.edu/history/SitePages/Napoleonic%20Wars.aspx>, all of the maps under the Jena Campaign section.

*Gen. Stanley McChrystal (U.S. Army, Ret.)*

- Stan McChrystal, *My Share of the Task*, pp. 89-263.

*Please start reading here. Students should skim it focusing on the narrative of the creation of the Joint Special Operations Task Force and reflecting on how the principles embodied in that organization reflect the theories and history of previous lessons.*

### Lesson 2, Sunday, July 17: One Napoleonic battle--Jena/Jomini

*Purpose: Apply the terms and concepts you learned in lesson 1 to the study of a particular campaign and then understand how two great military theorists did so.*

*Objectives:*

1. *Understand the Jena Campaign of 1806*
  - a. *Learn how to read military operational history with maps*
2. *Evaluate Clausewitz and Jomini as military theorists based on the lessons they derived from the 1806 campaign*
  - a. *Note that Clausewitz wrote an analytical and evaluative history of the campaign, whereas Jomini drew general lessons from the 1806 campaign and many other Napoleonic and pre-Napoleonic*

*conflicts—How much did the difference in approaches to drawing lessons affect the lessons that were drawn?*

- b. *Think about the question: “Are there rules or laws of military operations similar to those that exist in physics?” We will discuss it during lesson 4.*
- c. *Are you more comfortable with the Clausewitzian approach to drawing lessons or the Jominian approach? Which is more helpful? (Implied question: for what?)*

#### *Block 1: The Jena Campaign, 1806*

- Have the maps from Lesson 1 on hand while reading for this lesson.
- Hew Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War*, pp. 38-58  
*This reading provides a general overview and background on Napoleonic warfare and wars. It is useful if you know nothing at all about the period, but, even then, many of the salient points will be discussed in the Paret and Shy readings in this lesson. You should probably start with Paret and go back to this reading only if you’re feeling lost.*
- Peter Paret, *The Cognitive Challenge of War: Prussia 1806*, Chapter 1  
*This chapter gives some background on the war and narratives of the 1806 campaign and the Battles of Jena and Auerstedt that were its climax. Read this as operational military history, look for detail—dates, specific events, decisions, leaders, causes and effects.*
- Clausewitz, *Notes on Prussia in Her Great Catastrophe*.  
*NB: This is an unpublished essay Clausewitz wrote that was meant to be an explanatory history of the campaign. It is NOT On War, nor is it meant to be a military-theoretical work. Read it as a campaign narrative, trying to understand the flow of the campaign as Clausewitz saw it, as well as the key decision-points he identifies. Look for details here as well.*

#### *Block 2: Clausewitz and Jomini*

- Peter Paret, *The Cognitive Challenge of War: Prussia 1806*, Chapter 4
- John Shy, “Jomini,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, pp. 143-185.  
*The Paret and Shy readings form a coherent pair with some overlap. They both situate their thinkers in a late-18<sup>th</sup>-early-19<sup>th</sup> Century military theoretical milieu that was fascinating, but alien to all but the most serious current students of war. Paret presents the perspective that shaped Clausewitz while Shy brings Jomini and his theories to life. You should be reading to see how different experiences, goals, and perspectives led these two participant-theorists to very different conclusions about the nature of war.*
- For Jomini: *Art of War*, pp. 66-92 (skip or skim this if you have to skip anything). The Project Gutenberg eBook of *The Art of War*, by Baron De Jomini.  
<http://www.gutenberg.org/files/13549/13549-h/13549-h.htm>

### **Lesson 3, Monday, July 18: Clausewitz (friction, contrasting superficial with substantive understandings of war)**

*Purpose: Learn an additional language to describe military operations and theory, and evaluate the utility of that language in understanding traditional military theory.*

#### *Objectives:*

1. *Learn the basic concepts of nonlinearity, complexity, and chaos theory in the scientific/mathematical context from which they arose*
2. *Evaluate the validity of applying those concepts to the understanding of On War*
3. *Explore the utility of reading the work of Helmuth von Moltke the Elder through the prism of nonlinearity, complexity, and chaos theory*

#### *Block 1: Chaos, Nonlinearity, and Complexity*

- Edward Lorenz, *The Essence of Chaos*, Chapter 1  
*Lorenz was a meteorologist who made some of the most important intellectual breakthroughs in the formation of chaos theory as a mathematical discipline. This reading has nothing to do with war in principle, but, rather, describes what was at the time a new way of looking at aspects of the world that had been supposed previously to be rule-bound and predictable.*  
Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War,” in Thomas J. Czerwinski, *Coping with the Bounds: A Neo-Clausewitzian Primer* (available online at [http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Czerwinski\\_Coping.pdf](http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Czerwinski_Coping.pdf))  
*This is another, more detailed and broader, exposition of chaos theory, now with explicit reference to war, military theory, and, especially, Clausewitz. It specifically addresses On War, Book I, Chapter I, which is assigned for the next block of this lesson. You may want to read that first, or at least have it handy when reading the Beyerchen.*

*Block 2: Chaos Theory, Clausewitz, and Moltke*

- Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 75-123 (Book I, Chapters 1-8)  
*This is the core Clausewitz theory and the portion of the book that best represents his finished thought. Read it extremely closely. Look at the various analogies and metaphors he uses. Pay attention to the “extremes” and reflect on what he means by the concept of an extreme. You may find it useful to look at <http://csmt.uchicago.edu/glossary2004/dialectic.htm> if you are not familiar with the philosophical concept of the dialectic.*
- Hajo Holborn, “The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, 281-295.  
*This is a brief and brilliant essay on a phenomenally complex personality. The interplay between Moltke and Clausewitz requires careful examination. Reflect on the ways in which Moltke is a true Clausewitzian—and the ways in which he clearly is not. The following short excerpt from Moltke’s writings may help clarify.*
- Helmuth von Moltke, “On Strategy, 1871,” in *Moltke on the Art of War*, pp. 44-47

*Evening Engagement: Gettysburg Movie Clips*

**Lesson 4, Tuesday, July 19: Gettysburg Staff Ride (Off-Site, Day-Long Trip)**

*Purpose: Learn how to move from reading text and maps to seeing a battle unfold on terrain.*

*Objectives:*

1. *Understand how to “see” terrain using military cartography*
2. *Understand how terrain affects combat in particular technological and doctrinal circumstances*
3. *Understand how the operational war interacts with tactical decision-making before and during combat (Day 1)*
4. *Understand how strategic considerations shape tactical decision-making (Pickett’s Charge)*

READINGS FOR THE GETTYSBURG STAFF RIDE WILL BE DISTRIBUTED SEPARATELY.

Maps available at <http://www.westpoint.edu/history/SitePages/American%20Civil%20War.aspx> under Gettysburg Campaign

## Lesson 5, Wednesday, July 20: Politics and War: Clausewitz vs. Moltke

*Purpose: Reflect upon the correct relationship between military operations and high politics (or policy) in order to decide whether you believe that Clausewitz or Moltke had it right.*

*Objectives:*

- 1. Understand Clausewitz's views on the relationship between politics (policy) and military operations at every level. Are his views coherent or contradictory?*
- 2. Evaluate Moltke's portrayal of Clausewitz's views (consider both the Moltke reading and the footnote in On War noted below). Did Moltke get it right?*
- 3. Why was this dispute of such moment to Moltke? (Look to the Craig reading for this.)*
- 4. Was Moltke wrong, or had Clausewitz simply failed to foresee the kind of challenge Moltke faced?*

*Block 1: Clausewitz on Politics and War*

- Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 61-71  
*Notes by Clausewitz and his wife regarding the nature of the composition and the manner of its publication. This is extremely important front-matter. You need to understand how On War took the final form that it did and what aspects of it best reflected Clausewitz's most advanced thinking.*
- Re-read Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 75-99 (Book I, Chapters 1 and 2)  
*Seriously, re-read them. There is no amount of re-reading of On War that will cease to be of interest.*
- Clausewitz, *On War*, pp. 605-610 (Book VIII, Chapter 6, Part B) and especially see the note on p. 608  
*This is short and vital—especially the footnote. We say again: READ THE FOOTNOTE!*

*Block 2: Moltke and Clausewitz*

- Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945*, pp. 180-192  
*An important brief overview of the history in question.*
- Helmuth von Moltke, (Daniel J. Hughes, ed.), *Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings*, pp. 35-36, "War and Politics"
- Clausewitz, *Carl von Clausewitz: Two Letters on Strategy*, pp. 13-21 (a portion of Clausewitz's letter to Roeder, December 22, 1827)  
*This is an obscure, rarely-discussed exposition of Clausewitz's thoughts, particularly relating to the topic of this lesson. Your understanding of the Clausewitzian understanding of the relationship between war and politics (and therefore of that question itself) is apt to be partial if you don't read this letter.*

## Lesson 6, Thursday, July 21: Mechanization of war

*Purpose: Understand how changes in technology generated (required) transformations in military organization, doctrine, and theory.*

- Dennis Showalter, *Railroads and Rifles, Part One (Railroads)*, pp. 19-72  
*This is a long, intricate history of a period you're not likely familiar with at all. But you've already read about Moltke—who he was, where he came from, and what he did—and you've read some of his own writing. You've also read a lot about the Napoleonic Wars and, particularly, the different lessons contemporaries drew from them. This reading should help you reflect on the challenges and opportunities offered to military theorists and practitioners by changing technology. How can one tell if a new technology might revolutionize warfare? How can one guess about how to use that technology to do so? How do military requirements interact*

*with economic needs to shape the evolution of both military and civilian technology? What role do individuals play in generating disjunctive change?*

- Martin van Creveld, *Technology and War*, pp. 1-6, 311-320

## **Lesson 7, Friday, July 22: Schlieffen through stalemate / Birth of armored warfare**

*Purpose: Decide which of the following are true:*

- Trench warfare stalemate resulted from the stupidity of generals*
- Stalemate was the inevitable result of the military technology of the time*
- The German attack in 1914 failed because of Moltke's changes to Schlieffen's plan*
- The 1914 attack failed because Schlieffen designed it mechanistically and in disregard of Moltke's dictum that no plan survives first contact with the enemy*
- The attack failed because Schlieffen sought Napoleonic-style decisive victories in an era in which they were no longer possible*
- World War I represented a failure at the tactical level—or at the operational level?—or at the strategic level?*

### *Block 1: Schlieffen and the First Campaign of World War I*

*We will definitely cover this block today, regardless of the timing of General Petraeus's visit. Make sure that you have read these materials carefully.*

- James L. Stokesbury, *A Short History of World War I*, pp. 22-56 (through the First Marne)  
*Recommended as overview; not required—but make sure you understand what happened in 1914 through the First Battle of the Marne.*
- Gunther Rothenberg, "Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, pp. 296-325.  
*Another brilliant essay from one of the best compilations of writings about war ever produced. Pay careful attention—there are TWO Helmuth von Moltkes. You've been reading about Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, who introduced railway mobilization and the general staff system to the Prussian Army and led that army through the Wars of German Unification. Now you'll meet his nephew, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, who will occupy his uncle's position as Germany approaches and enters World War I. Use this essay to reflect on all of the theoretical and practical debates swirling between Clausewitz, Moltke the Elder, Jomini, and Schlieffen about the nature of war as art, science, or a hybrid.*
- "The 'Schlieffen' Plan," Terence Zuber, *German War Planning, 1891-1914: Sources and Interpretations*, pp. 187-204 (Read closely and with a map)  
*This is the closest we can get to the "Schlieffen Plan," which was destroyed along with most of the documents relating to Germany's pre-war planning in a vain attempt to absolve Germany of responsibility for the war. This is NOT the actual plan, however. It is a concept of operations, and a preliminary one. Understand how it was supposed to work. Try to identify logical gaps and potential problems within this document. Then reflect on how much Moltke the Younger was to blame for the "failure" of the "Schlieffen Plan." Finally, think about what this debate says about the nature of war.*
- "1920: Kuhl Reveals the Schlieffen Plan," Zuber, pp. 265-271

### *Block 2: Coping with Trench-warfare Stalemate*

*If we don't get to this on this day, we will start with it on Saturday. This block is absolutely pivotal for understanding the evolution of armored warfare, so do not skip it. Make sure that you read the Lupfer without fail. If we don't get to it today, then skim to refresh your memory on it during the reading day tomorrow so that you have it in your mind on Saturday.*

- Timothy Lupfer, *The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War*, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1981. (58 pages). <http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/lupfer.pdf>  
*This is the only reading this lesson that describes the nature and challenges of trench warfare—understanding that is more important than mastering the details of infiltration tactics.*
- J. F. C. Fuller, “Plan 1919” from *Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldiers*.  
“Plan 1919” was not a campaign plan (and was never implemented, of course). It was meant as a demonstrative sketch of a new concept of operations.  
*In addition, Fuller, “The Application Of Recent Developments In Mechanics And Other Scientific Knowledge To Preparation And Training For Future War On Land,” Gold Medal (Military) Prize Essay in the journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 1919 is a brilliant a nuanced exposition of the same general ideas. Reading it is not required, but you should at least skim it to see the differences.*

## Saturday, July 23: Reading Day

### Lesson 8, Sunday, July 24: Armored Warfare and Operational Art

*Purpose: Understand the evolution of operational art as a distinct branch of military theory and practice.*

- Wilhelm Deist, “The Road to Ideological War: Germany 1918-1945,” in Williamson Murray, *The Making of Strategy*, pp. 352-371  
*Pay special attention to the interplay between political goals, ideology, and military theory and doctrine. Reflect on the continued relevance—or lack thereof—of Clausewitz’s definition of war as an extension of policy.*
- Eric von Manstein, *Lost Victories*, Part III, Ch. 8  
*Von Manstein was one of the greatest armored commanders and operational artists of the Wehrmacht in the Second World War. But this is a memoir written after the war for purposes that may occur to you...*
- Dennis Showalter, *Hitler’s Panzers*, Ch. 1
- David Glantz, *Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle*, (New York: Frank Cass, 1991), Chapter 2, “The Nature of Operational Art.”  
*Make sure you get to this reading. The Germans took armored warfare and operational art one way—the Soviets took it somewhere rather different. Make sure you can sense the differences.*

### Lesson 9, Monday, July 25: Airpower--Douhet to Warden

*Purpose: Understand the terms and concepts of air power theory as it evolved from early in the 20<sup>th</sup> century to the present.*

*Objectives:*

1. *Understand the rationale for seeing airpower as fundamentally revolutionary in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century*
2. *Evaluate the nature of the debate over the right relationship between airpower and other forms of military power in that time*
3. *Master the concept of “center of gravity” as it is used in the context of airpower theory*
4. *Compare and contrast the airpower view of the enemy (and how to operate against him) with the view presented by operational art theory*
5. *Consider both operational art and airpower theory in the context of nonlinearity, complexity, and chaos theory*

*From the Origins of Air Power Theory to Its Modern State*

- David MacIsaac, "Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists," *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Chapter 21, pp. 624-647.
- John Warden, *The Air Campaign* (Entire). This is a long reading, but students should focus on Chapters 1, 2, 10, "The Air Campaign in Retrospect," and the epilogue.
- David Deptula, "Defining Rapid Decisive Operations: Parallel Warfare," in *Effects Based Operations: Changes in the Nature of War*, <http://www.ausairpower.net/PDF-A/AEF-AFA-Effect-Based-Operations-D.A.Deptula-2001.pdf>, pp. 3-7.
- The brilliant, if difficult to comprehend, briefings of US Air Force Colonel John F. Boyd are available at <http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Boyd-Papers.html>. *These are NOT required readings, but they are seminal works shaping the evolution of American airpower theory—and, thus, of the world's airpower theory. It's worth taking a look at them if only to see the form and method of argumentation.*

## Lesson 10, Tuesday, July 26: The Origins and Character of the Post-Cold War Era

### Objectives:

1. *How should policy makers and military leaders think about the future of warfare and defense in an era at an architectonic moment, when they have so much ability and creativity to shape world affairs?*
2. *What were the core characteristics of the character of war in the new era?*
3. *How did the administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton define American interests and objectives? What were the main commonalities and differences among their views?*
4. *How well did Bush and Clinton translate their foreign policy and national security visions into military tasks, including the task of organizing the military to support them?*
5. *Did the United States successfully reconfigure its military for the post-Cold War Era?*

### Background and Reference

- The Weinberger, Powell, and Clinton Doctrines
- *Please note that this usage of doctrine communicates the general principles of policy about the use of force (as in the Monroe Doctrine), rather than being military doctrine in the technical sense.*
- Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, speech at the National Press Club on 28 November 1984, available at: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/weinberger.html>
- *This is the "Weinberger Doctrine," from President Ronald Reagan's Secretary of Defense, ostensibly defining the conditions under which the U.S. can reasonably intervene abroad. It powerfully influenced Colin Powell and George H. W. Bush.*

- Jim Mokhiber and Rick Young, “The Uses of Military Force,” contains a quick overview of the Powell doctrine in context. The Powell doctrine was not delivered as a speech. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/military/force/>
- Dick Cheney, *Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy*. <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb245/doc15.pdf>
- *This was the first national security strategy drafted after the end of the Cold War. It began as a normal Defense Planning Guidance document in June 1991 and was completed in mid-1992 before the November election in which Bill Clinton defeated George H. W. Bush. It was only declassified and released in January 1993, shortly before Clinton’s inauguration. It therefore has received no attention whatsoever, despite being the first concerted attempt to wrestle with the implications of the new world order.*
- Remarks of Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, “From Containment to Enlargement,” Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., September 21, 1993. Available at: <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html>
- *This is the key speech by President Bill Clinton’s National Security Advisor laying out the principles for that administration.*

#### *A New World Order*

#### **Gulf War quick overview:**

- Allen Millet and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, Revised and Expanded Edition, (Free Press, 1984) Chapter 19 from header, “The Bush Administration Confronts Regional Crises.”

#### **The Gulf War, the Fall of the Soviet Union, and the Birth of the Post-Cold War Era**

- Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, (Random House LLC, 1998) Chapters 13, 14, 15 (from p. 368 or “The joint statement”) 17 and 18. [So only a section of 15 and not 16]. Then 19, 20, and 21 on the fall of the Soviet Union.

#### **The Clinton Years**

- Michael Mandelbaum, *Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post-Cold War Era*, (Oxford University Press, 2016) Chapter 2, Humanitarian Intervention.
- Frederick W. Kagan, *Finding the Target*, (Encounter Books, 2006) 144-198 (Chapters 4 and 5)
- Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, 16 June 1995, [http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp3\\_07.pdf](http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp3_07.pdf).

#### **Wednesday, July 27: Reading and Advising Day [TBC]**

*While catching up on reading and meeting with your instructors, you may also want to view the following videos about what happened on September 11, 2001 from the perspective of*



*President Bush as the commander-in-chief. The purpose of this exercise is to try to understand a little of the thoughts and emotions of that time and how they shaped his strategic calculations and decision-making. Try hard to keep the events of the intervening 14 years out of your mind as you watch these videos in order to put yourself as best you can in the position of someone experiencing the 9/11 attacks as they unfolded.*

<http://www.history.com/topics/9-11-attacks/videos/911-timeline>. *This is compilation of videos and commentary about the attack on the World Trade Center.*

[http://www.natgeotv.com/ca/george\\_w\\_bush\\_the\\_911\\_interview/videos/interview-with-george-w-bush](http://www.natgeotv.com/ca/george_w_bush_the_911_interview/videos/interview-with-george-w-bush). *This is an interview with President Bush after he left office about the events of 9/11.*

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x7OCgMPX2mE>. *This is a video of the brief statement President Bush made at the ruins of the World Trade Center on September 14, 2001. The audience was primarily composed of rescue workers continuing to comb through the wreckage for survivors.*

Bush at Booker Elementary School: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IedVRYUNWUU>. *This is the full video of President Bush's visit with the elementary school class on 9/11 at which he heard of the second plane hitting the World Trade Center.*

*Evening Engagement in the Dorm: Surge DVD*

## **Lesson 11, Thursday, July 28: Iraq -- 2003 Invasion to the Insurgency and the Surge**

*Purpose: Is counterinsurgency a different phenomenon from the rest of modern war?*

*Objectives:*

- 1. Evaluate whether counterinsurgency can be understood with terms and concepts of modern, conventional warfare.*
- 2. Understand campaign design in counterinsurgency and its relationship to political outcomes.*
- 3. Understand differences between civilian and military approaches to a counterinsurgency, and understand how civilian and military agencies worked together to achieve objectives during the surge.*

- Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *The Endgame: the Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012). Selections as follows:
  - pp. 212-218 (Operation Together Forward I, June 2006, read from, "On June 14, Maliki...");
  - pp. 223-239 (Evaluating Together Forward I and II, read from, "Even as the militias swamped the ministries...");
  - 297-300 (Odierno's plan, begin reading at "Even as Bush...");

- pp. 332-350 (Petraeus's surge, begin "On his third day back");
- pp. 353-368 (the JSAT, or civil-military strategic review, read from, "Petraeus had a penchant).
- 369-409 (The Former Insurgent Counterinsurgency);
- 415-422 (Phantom Strike, begin at "Two Weeks into Operation Phantom Thunder);
- 564-504 (Basra; Sadr City).
- Peter R. Mansoor, *Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War* (Yale University Press, 2013), 5-33 (Ch. 1).

## Lesson 12, Friday, July 29: Leadership and Command

*Purpose: What is command and how do leaders manifest it?*

*Objectives:*

2. *Consider the development of the Joint Special Operations Task Force in Iraq as a revolutionary new application of operational art. Was it successful? Why or why not?*