



Course Syllabus

Summer Course

Instructor Information

INSTRUCTORS

DR. KIMBERLY KAGAN

DR. FREDERICK KAGAN

LT. GEN. (RET.) JAMES DUBIK, US ARMY

CO-INSTRUCTORS

GEN (RET.) JOHN ALLEN, US MARINE CORPS

GUEST SPEAKERS

DAN BLUMENTHAL, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

MASON CLARK, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR

GEN (RET.) STANLEY MCCHRYSTAL, US ARMY

LT. GEN. (RET.) H.R. MCMASTER, US ARMY

LT. GEN. (RET.) MICHAEL NAGATA, US ARMY

GEN (RET.) DAVID PETRAEUS, US ARMY

MAJ GEN (RET.) MICK RYAN, AUSTRALIAN ARMY

KATERYNA STEPANENKO, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR

ALEXIS TUREK, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS CENTER FOR EMERGING LEADERS

DR. BRIAN BABCOCK-LUMISH, DIRECTOR

General Information

Description: Lessons are daylong, beginning at 9:30 am and ending at 5:30 pm unless otherwise noted; some are divided into two blocks when they address different topics.

Course Materials

Required Materials

Readings and videos are on Slack and Dropbox. Required videos are marked.

Books and purchases:

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984)
2. Kimberly Kagan, *The Surge: A Military History* (New York, NY: Encounter Books, 2008)
3. Stanley A. McChrystal, *My Share of the Task: A Memoir* (New York, NY: Portfolio/Penguin, 2014)
4. Peter Paret, *Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010)

5. David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts, *Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine* (New York, NY: Harper, 2023)
6. Mick Ryan, *War Transformed: The Future of Twenty-First-Century Great Power Competition and Conflict* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2022)
7. Gordon R. Sullivan & Michael V. Harper, *Hope is Not a Method: What Business Leaders Can Learn from America's Army* (New York, NY: Currency, 1997)
8. John A. Warden III, *The Air Campaign, Revised Edition* (iUniverse: 1998)
9. John R. Allen, Frederick Ben Hodges, and Julian Lindley-French, *Future War and the Defence of Europe* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2021)

Lesson 1	July 19th
TOPIC	LANGUAGE & LOGIC OF WAR
GUEST CO-INSTRUCTOR	GEN (Ret.) John Allen
PURPOSE	<i>Gain foundational knowledge vital for the remainder of the course, including the levels of war framework</i>
OBJECTIVES	<p>How are militaries organized? What frameworks help us study war? How do you read a military map?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Learn the levels of war</i> 2. <i>Learn how military forces are organized and echeloned</i> 3. <i>Learn the basic vocabulary needed to discuss war and military operations</i> 4. <i>Understand how to read military maps and symbols</i>
KEY TERMS	<i>Levels of war; Grand strategic level, Strategic level, Operational level, Tactical level Campaign; Battle; Doctrine; Services; Branches (and the branches themselves); Joint Combined; Combined arms; Firepower; Maneuver; Movement; Unit; Formation Fireteams; Squad; Light infantry squad; Crew served weapons; Individual weapons Direct fire, Indirect fire; Rate of fire; Commissioned officer; Non-commissioned officer; Table of organization and equipment (TO&E); Task organization; Combat power; Staff; Span of control; Command and control; Chain of command; Defeat; Destroy</i>
MULTIMEDIA (REQUIRED)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maps: Austerlitz (1805) Campaign Section <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ https://westpoint.edu/academics/academic-departments/history/napoleonic-wars • Videos: Reading a Topographical Map <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ SMCT: Identify Topographic Symbols on a Military Map https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ij0_6gfBF5w ○ SMCT: Identify Terrain Features on a Military Map https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YZJaV1MARhc • Videos: Military Symbols <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Squad Movement Formation & Techniques https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OKRues4Fwrk ○ The Rifle Platoon Dismounted Movement Techniques Vintage US Army Film https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-qdFd9Uh0N0 ○ TANK TACTICS: Fast Armored Tactics https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=chMDas1oyUU (Begin at 5:25)
READINGS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reading Packet (Kagan Readings) 2. Kateryna Stepanenko, “The Kremlin’s Pyrrhic Victory in Bakhmut: A Retrospective on the Battle for Bakhmut,” <i>Institute for the Study of War</i>, May 2023 3. US Department of Defense, Chapter 1, “Theory and Foundations,” <i>Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States</i>, Joint Publication 1 https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf 4. US Department of the Army, <i>Operational Terms and Graphics</i>, Army Field

	<p>Manual 1-02</p> <p>https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN19780_FM%201-02x1%20-%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Tactical Terms (in the first chapter, 1-1, beginning on p. 13 of the pdf) ○ Chapter 3 the military symbols basics, 3-1 to 3-10 are important ○ Chapter 4 gives main icons for units (better); focus on section 4-4 (echelon amplifiers) through 4-6 (attached amplifiers) ○ Chapter 9 gives tactical mission tasks with their symbols, useful for putting up against terms and also many maps that we will look at.
LESSON PLAN	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Explain the four levels of war and how they are inter-related. Be prepared to use a World War II example of your choosing to illustrate each of the four levels. 2. Explain the term “echelons” as it applies to an army. Be prepared to describe the ranks of those commanding a squad, platoon, company, battalion, brigade, division, corps, and army. Also be prepared to describe the general capabilities of each of these commands. 3. Explain the symbols used on military maps for infantry, armor, artillery, cavalry units and headquarters. Be prepared to describe the symbol for each echelon listed in question. 4. Be prepared to defend your position on the following proposition: There is a direct and fixed correlation between the levels of war and echelons of command.

Lesson 2	July 20th
TOPIC	ONE NAPOLEONIC BATTLE — AUSTERLITZ
GUEST CO-INSTRUCTOR	GEN (Ret.) John Allen
PURPOSE	<i>Apply the terms and concepts you learned in Lesson 1 to the study of a particular campaign.</i>
OBJECTIVES	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Understand the Austerlitz Campaign of 1805 <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Learn how to read military operational history with maps</i> <i>Learn how to evaluate a campaign</i> <i>How did each actor understand the situation at the start of the period covered by the reading? How accurate were their respective pictures?</i> <i>What assumptions did each actor make about what the others would do and his own capabilities?</i> <i>What plans did each actor make to achieve his objectives based on that understanding?</i> <i>Were the plans good? What would that mean?</i> <i>How well did each actor execute his plans?</i> <i>How well did each actor adjust his understanding of the situation both to new information and to changes in the situation itself?</i> <i>Why did Napoleon win? Why did the coalition lose?</i> <i>How did political, diplomatic, and inter-personal considerations affect the conduct of military operations?</i> <i>What lessons should each actor (including Napoleon) have drawn from this campaign?</i> Which actor was best (and which was worst) at each level of war from strategic to tactical? Bring evidence to bear! How did each side try to shape the other's perceptions of the situation and its own intentions? Which was more successful? Why?
KEY TERMS	<i>Offense; Defense; Maneuver; Flank; Envelop; Campaign; Battle; Order of battle; Decisive battle; Defeat in detail</i>
MULTIMEDIA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Video: <i>Napoleon's Masterpiece – Austerlitz 1805</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bhQe2cjr5XQ
READINGS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> David G. Chandler, <i>Austerlitz 1805: Battle of Three Emperors</i> (London: Osprey Publishing, Ltd., 1990), pp. 6–20 Frederick W. Kagan, <i>The End of the Old Order: Napoleon and Europe, 1801–1805</i> (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2008), Chs. 17–18, 21–23
LESSON PLAN RUSSIA, FRANCE,	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Using Austerlitz on August 25, 1805, as an example, what are your grand strategic, strategic, operational, and tactical objectives? What are your assumptions and understanding of your opponent and the overall situation about to unfold at Austerlitz?

AUSTRIA

2. How did your group envisioned the battle unfolding. How did the battle actually unfold for you, and (b) why it unfolded as it did?
3. What were the key points in time when your group thought that situation changed so much you had to adapt your plan? How did you adapted—what did you change or modify and what did you leave unchanged? Did those adaptation work as you thought they would? Why?

Afternoon

1. Which side:
 - a. Had the more accurate initial understanding and why.
 - b. Adapted “better” or “faster than the other and why? What allowed them to adapt “better” or “faster,” and prevented the other from doing so?
2. An understanding of how adaptation applies to each level of war.

Lesson 3	July 21st
TOPIC	BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG
GUEST CO-INSTRUCTOR	GEN (Ret.) John Allen
PURPOSE	<i>War in reality vs. war on paper: visualize a battlefield, a campaign, and a war</i>
OBJECTIVES	<p>Apply Lesson 1 and 2 framework to the Gettysburg campaign; focus on visualizing battles on terrain</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Understand how to “see” terrain using military cartography</i> 2. <i>Understand how terrain affects combat in particular technological and doctrinal circumstances</i> 3. <i>Understand how the operational level of war interacts with tactical decision-making before and during combat</i> 4. <i>Understand how strategic considerations shape tactical decision-making</i> 5. <i>Understand the moral and ethical consequences of military decision-making</i> 6. <i>Understand how some military theorists and practitioners interpreted and implemented Napoleonic warfare</i>
KEY TERMS	<i>Meeting engagement; Military crest; Enfilading fire</i>
MULTIMEDIA	<p><u>Optional:</u></p> <p>Watch Ahead of Class – Understanding Gettysburg</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil War Infantry Tactics https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tYg3v9IUuNA • Civil War Artillery https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=85s-yMUAfqM • Civil War Analysis of Terrain https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RktUeoA3F7w • Civil War Logistics https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ISDQGsdvX4 • Civil War Medicine https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IDYWP2fz4-E

<p>READINGS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stephen Sears, Chapters 1–2, <i>Gettysburg</i> (New York: Mariner Books Reprint, 2004) • James McPherson, Chapter 21, <i>Battle Cry of Freedom</i> (Oxford: University of Oxford Press, 1988) • Excerpts from Mark Grimsley and Brooks Simpson, <i>Gettysburg, A Battlefield Guide</i> (Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1999) <p><u>Optional:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jay Luvas, “Lee and the Operational Art: The Right Place, The Right Time,” <i>Parameters</i>, Autumn 1992.
<p>STUDY GUIDE & LESSON PLAN</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Understand who did what to whom. Know the key players on each side. Make a “cheat sheet” for yourself: Who were the corps commanders under Lee and under Meade? Who were the division commanders under each corps commander? Who were the regimental commanders under each division commander? Who were the cavalry commanders working for Lee and Meade? 2. Understand the context. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Read chapters 1-2, Stephen Sears, <i>Gettysburg</i>. b. As you read use at least two maps from the West Point link provided on the syllabus to follow along. Situation 1 June 1863 and Gettysburg and Vicinity, 1 July 1863. c. Watch the 5 short videos labeled “understanding Gettysburg” from the syllabus. 3. Understand the terrain. Take a virtual tour of the battlefield. https://www.nps.gov/gett/learn/photosmultimedia/virtualtour.htm. Read the summaries of each day before you take the virtual tour. 4. Know how the battle unfolded. Watch the Gettysburg movie clips. Keep your order of battle (Section III of the PDF handout) and your West Point maps (https://www.westpoint.edu/academics/academic-departments/history/american-civil-war) available to keep you oriented. 5. At each stop. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <u>Orient</u> the group to the cardinal directions and to where the Confederate and Union Forces are.

b. Identify the commander and units of both sides.

c. Present the facts:

- (1) what did each commander intend to do (what was their concept of operations, how did they “see” their forces maneuver and fight, who did they think things would end up)
- (2) how did what they intended fit, or not fit, into that commander’s senior’s intent
- (3) what actually happened
- (4) why the difference between what was intended and what unfolded, if any.

6. Along the tour, be prepared to discuss the questions below.

a. Context. Why did Lee go on the offensive? What did you hope to achieve? What was the CSA’s political objective at this point of the war? From which direction did Lee come? Upon what roads did he march his corps? How did he use his cavalry? What was the Union’s political objective? Given that, what military objective should Meade have deduced from that objective? From which direction did Meade’s army come? Upon what roads did he march his corps? How did he use his cavalry?

b. Day One. How did the battle begin, by whom of the CSA, by whom of the Union? What were the key decisions made on each side, and by whom? What were the consequences of those decisions? How did the day one battle unfold across the terrain? Why did the CSA and the Union do what they did—why were the day one battles fought where they were fought? Why didn’t the CSA attack Culps Hill in the late afternoon of day one? Should they have? Was this a missed opportunity? Who had the initiative on day one? Might there have been a difference between tactical and operational initiative? Who “won” day one? Why did you make that conclusion?

c. Day Two. How were the two armies disposed on the battlefield? What was Lee’s plan for day two? Who was to execute that plan? How was the plan supposed to be coordinated? What actually happened? Was Longstreet derelict in his command duties? What did the Union army expect to happen, and how were they prepared for what they

expected? How did they have to adapt to what the CSA actually did? Who gave what orders to whom to make these adaptation? Who had the initiative at the end of day two? Again, can you distinguish between tactical and operational initiative? Who “won” day two? Why did you make that conclusion?

- d. Day Three. How were the two armies disposed on the battlefield? What was Lee’s plan for day two? Who was to execute that plan? How was the plan supposed to be coordinated? What actually happened? What alternatives did Lee have? Why didn’t take them? What did the Union army expect to happen, and how where they prepared for what they expected? How did they have to adapt to what the CSA actually did? Who gave what orders to whom to make these adaptation? Who had the initiative at the end of day three? Again, can you distinguish between tactical and operational initiative? Who “won” day three? Why did you make that conclusion?
- e. Context. Did either the CSA’s or the Union’s strategic objectives met or partially met at the end of day three? Did either attain the military objectives they had at the start of the battle? Should Meade have pursued Lee? How do you judge the success or failure of a battle or campaign?
-

Lesson 4	July 22nd
TOPIC	CLAUSEWITZ (FRICTION, CONTRASTING SUPERFICIAL WITH SUBSTANTIVE UNDERSTANDINGS OF WAR); CHAOS & WAR
GUEST CO-INSTRUCTOR	GEN (Ret.) John Allen
PURPOSE	<i>Learn an additional language to describe military operations and theory and evaluate the utility of that language in understanding traditional military theory.</i>
OBJECTIVES	<p>What is war? What should a theory of war achieve? Can it forecast an outcome?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Read Clausewitz, Books I and VIII and discuss the questions above</i> 2. <i>Learn the basic concepts of nonlinearity, complexity, and chaos theory in the scientific/mathematical context from which they arose</i> 3. <i>Evaluate the validity of applying those concepts to the understanding of On War</i>
KEY TERMS	<i>War, Politics, Extremes, Critical analysis // Nonlinearity, Chaos, Sensitive dependence on initial conditions, Random, Additive</i>
READINGS	<p><u>BLOCK I: Chaos Theory, Clausewitz, & Moltke</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Azar Gat, Chapter 6, “The Reaction against the Enlightenment,” <i>A History of Military Thought from the Enlightenment to the Cold War</i>, pp. 141–57 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <i>This section situates Clausewitz in the context of the Counter-Enlightenment or German Movement and introduces some of the philosophical trends and ideas we talk about in class.</i> • Clausewitz, <i>On War</i> (Book I, Chapters 1–8, Book II, Chapters 5–6), pp. 75–123 and 156–74 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <i>This is the core Clausewitz theory and the portion of the book that best represents his finished thought. Read it extremely closely. Look at the various analogies and metaphors he uses. Pay attention to the “extremes” and reflect on what he means by the concept of an extreme. You may find it useful to look at http://csmt.uchicago.edu/glossary2004/dialectic.htm if you are not familiar with the philosophical concept of the dialectic.</i> • Optional: Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, Chapters 5, 9, and 11, <i>Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman Behind the Making of On War</i> • Optional: John Shy, “Jomini,” in <i>Makers of Modern Strategy</i>, pp. 143–185 <p><u>BLOCK II: Chaos, Nonlinearity, & Complexity</u></p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War,” in Thomas J. Czerwinski, <i>Coping with the Bounds: A Neo-Clausewitzian Primer</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <i>This is another, more detailed and broader, exposition of chaos theory, now with explicit reference to war, military theory, and, especially, Clausewitz. It specifically addresses On War, Book I, Chapter 1, which is assigned for the next block of this lesson. You may want to read that first, or at least have it handy when reading the Beyerchen.</i> • Edward Lorenz, Chapters 1 and 4, <i>The Essence of Chaos</i> (Seattle, WA: Univ. of Washington Press, 2008) (Focus on the section that starts with “Searching” subhead and read until the end of the chapter). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <i>Lorenz was a meteorologist who made some of the most important intellectual breakthroughs in the formation of chaos theory as a mathematical discipline. This reading has nothing to do with war in principle, but, rather, describes what was at the time a new way of looking at aspects of the world that had been supposed previously to be rule-bound and predictable.</i>
LESSON PLAN	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. How does Clausewitz define, describe, and use the following concepts: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>War as a duel and pair of wrestlers.</i> What is Clausewitz trying to tell us using these analogies? b. <i>Genius.</i> What is Clausewitz’s concept of genius, and what does this concept tell us about Clausewitz’s understanding of war? c. <i>Friction and fog of war.</i> What are the sources of friction and fog? To what extent can friction and fog be eliminated or reduced, if at all? d. <i>War by algebra.</i> What does Clausewitz mean by “war by algebra,” and what is the central point he is trying to make about war? 2. The role of “theory,” “critical analysis,” and “historical examples.” <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>Theory:</i> What is it, and why is it useful? b. <i>Critical analysis:</i> Its definition and role? c. <i>Historical examples:</i> What is the proper use of historical examples? d. The definition and role of “extremes” in understanding war. e. What does the discussion of theory, critical analysis, historical examples, and polarity/extremes tell us about how Clausewitz understands war? 3. Clausewitz’s understanding of war. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. <i>The trinity:</i> “More than” a chameleon. What is Clausewitz’s central idea in his discussion of the trinity and his use of the chameleon analogy? What does this central idea say about war? b. What is war and what is war not, in Clausewitz’s mind? 4. Purpose and means. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. What is (are) the purpose(s) of war and how is (are) purpose(s)

	related to means? Can there be multiple forms of combat? How? Why?
--	---

Lesson 5	July 23rd
TOPIC	POLITICS & WAR: CLAUSEWITZ VS. MOLTKE
GUEST CO-INSTRUCTOR	GEN (Ret.) John Allen
GUEST FACULTY	Maj. Gen. (R) Mick Ryan
PURPOSE	<i>Reflect upon the correct relationship between military operations and high politics (or policy) in order to decide whether you believe that Clausewitz or Moltke had it right.</i>
OBJECTIVES	<p>How much can and should a political leader intervene in military operations?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <i>1. Understand Clausewitz's views on the relationship between politics (policy) and military operations at every level. Are his views coherent or contradictory?</i> <i>2. Evaluate Moltke's portrayal of Clausewitz's views (consider both the Moltke reading and the footnote in On War noted below). Did Moltke get it right?</i> <i>3. Why was this dispute of such moment to Moltke? (Look to the Craig reading for this.)</i> <i>4. Was Moltke wrong, or had Clausewitz simply failed to foresee the kind of challenge Moltke faced?</i> <i>5. What does it mean to have a "system of war" or "war as a system?"</i> <i>6. Explore the utility of reading the work of Helmuth von Moltke the Elder through the prism of nonlinearity, complexity, and chaos theory.</i>
KEY TERMS	<i>War as a system</i>
READINGS	<p><u>Block I: Clausewitz on Politics and War</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clausewitz, <i>On War</i>, pp. 61–71 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ <i>Notes by Clausewitz and his wife regarding the nature of the composition and the manner of its publication. This is extremely important front-matter. You need to understand how On War took the final form that it did and what aspects of it best reflected Clausewitz's most advanced thinking.</i> • Re-read Clausewitz, <i>On War</i>, pp. 75–99 (Book I, Chs. 1 and 2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ <i>Seriously, re-read them. There is no amount of re-reading of On War that will cease to be of interest.</i> • Clausewitz, <i>On War</i>, pp. 605–10 (Book VIII, Ch. 6, Part B) and especially see the note on p. 608 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ <i>This is short and vital—especially the footnote. We say again: READ THE FOOTNOTE!</i> <p><u>Block II: Moltke and Clausewitz</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clausewitz, <i>Carl von Clausewitz: Two Letters on Strategy</i>, pp. 1–21

	<p>(a portion of Clausewitz’s letter to Roeder, December 22, 1827)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <i>This is an obscure, rarely discussed exposition of Clausewitz’s thoughts, particularly relating to the topic of this lesson. Your understanding of the Clausewitzian understanding of the relationship between war and politics (and therefore of that question itself) is apt to be partial if you do not read this letter.</i> • Gordon A. Craig, <i>The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945</i>, pp. 180–216 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <i>An important brief overview of the history in question</i> • Hajo Holborn, “The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff,” in <i>Makers of Modern Strategy</i>, pp. 281–95 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <i>This is a brief and brilliant essay on a phenomenally complex personality. The interplay between Moltke and Clausewitz requires careful examination. Reflect on the ways in which Moltke is a true Clausewitzian—and the ways in which he clearly is not. The following short excerpt from Moltke’s writings may help clarify.</i> • Helmuth von Moltke, “War and Politics,” in <i>Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings</i>, ed. Daniel J. Hughes, pp. 35–36 • von Moltke, “On Strategy, 1871,” in <i>Moltke on the Art of War</i>, pp. 44–47 • Gunther Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment,” in <i>Makers of Modern Strategy</i>, pp. 296–310 (we will revisit the remainder of the article in the next lesson) • Mick Ryan, <i>War Transformed: The Future of Twenty-First-Century Great Power Competition and Conflict</i>
LESSON PLAN	<p>Incorporate Books I, II, and VIII as well as the notes and letters into your answers.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. War and its purpose. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Once set, is a war’s aim fixed? If so, why? If not, why not? b. What is the relationship between a war’s aim and the means used to achieve that aim? c. What is the relationship between policy and military action at each level of war? 2. Between the political and the military. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. How are the roles of the political and military leaders differentiated, if at all? 3. Theory and practice. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Does Clausewitz suggest that from the start one must conceive of war as a whole or just conceive of the first steps then adapt? Why does he take the position that he does?

- | | |
|--|---|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none">b. What does “defeat” mean? The doctrinal definition and how Clausewitz discusses it.c. What is the relationship between absolute and real war? Why does this relationship matter?d. In the end, is Clausewitz’s theory of war coherent and consistent –either, both? |
|--|---|

Lesson 6	July 24th
TOPIC	RAILROADS & RIFLES
GUEST CO-INSTRUCTOR	GEN (Ret.) John Allen
PURPOSE	<i>Understand how changes in technology generated (required) transformations in military organization, doctrine, and theory.</i>
OBJECTIVES	<i>How does a revolutionary new technology change the conduct of war? And how does any large organization adopt a revolutionary new technology?</i>
KEY TERMS	
MULTIMEDIA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Video: Understanding Railroads <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The Railroad Journey and the Industrial Revolution: Crash Course World History 214 https://youtu.be/GYAk5jCTQ3s
READINGS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dennis Showalter, <i>Railroads and Rifles</i>, Part One (Railroads), pp. 19–72 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <i>This is a long, intricate history of a period you are not likely familiar with at all. But you have already read about Moltke—who he was, where he came from, and what he did—and you have read some of his own writing. You have also read a lot about the Napoleonic Wars and, particularly, the different lessons contemporaries drew from them. This reading should help you reflect on the challenges and opportunities offered to military theorists and practitioners by changing technology. How can one tell if a new technology might revolutionize warfare? How can one guess about how to use that technology to do so? How do military requirements interact with economic needs to shape the evolution of both military and civilian technology? What role do individuals play in generating disjunctive change?</i> • Review the two <i>Makers of Modern Strategy</i> chapters on Moltke the Elder from previous lessons. • Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan and Col. James M. Dubik, <i>Envisioning Future Warfare</i>, 1995 https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/sullivan.pdf • James M. Dubik, <i>The Army's "Twofer": The Dual Role of the Interim Force</i>, October 2001 https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/LWP-39-The-Armys-Twofer-The-Dual-Role-of-the-Interim-Force.pdf • Gen. (Ret.) Gordon Sullivan and Col. (Ret.) Michael Harper, <i>Hope is Not a Method</i>, pp. 9–21, 39–42, 49–54, 77–82, 147–49, 155–71, 182–87,

	<p>and 236–41 [ebook sections--9-21: Ch 1 from "Front End Work" to end of chapter; 39-42: Ch 3 "When in Charge, Be in Charge"; 49-54: "Leadership Action Cycle" thru "Somali Road"; 77-82: Ch 5 "The Power of Vision" thru "Thinking and Doing"; 147-49: Ch 9 "Better is Better"; 155-71: "Dual Nature of Change" thru Ch 10 "Demonstrating the Future"; 182-87: Ch 10 "Overcoming Resistance to Change" thru "Buy In and Critical Mass"; 236-41: Ch 13 "Rules (with a Small "R") for Guiding Change"]</p>
<p>LESSON PLAN & STUDY GUIDE</p>	<p>Part 1.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Understand the chronology of railroad development. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Read the Showalter piece. Come to class having developed your own chronology. As you read, list the date of every event marking the progress of the railroads or an obstacle to that progress. List also the key person(s) associated with that event and what they did to advance or obstruct the development of the railroad as well as why they did so. Come to class also being able to describe the different kinds of actions that moved railroads from a concept to a reality—i.e. the difference between having an idea, selling that idea, proving the idea, adopting the idea, institutionalizing the idea, and adapting the idea. <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Watch “The Railroad Journey and the Industrial Revolution.” Try to figure out what “Machines make their own laws” might mean. Try also to figure out what understanding railroads “as a system” might mean. Go back through your chronology. Identify point at which “having” the idea of a rail system began and ended. Do the same with “selling, proving, adopting, institutionalizing, and adapting.” Identify also the overlap between these activities as well as which activities were sequential and which were simultaneous? Look at the people associated with each of these activities. List their strengths and weaknesses. What characteristics allowed them to succeed or fail? Be prepared to brief your chronology and the categories within at the start of class. What exactly does “institutionalization” mean in the military context?

What are the conditions that allow one to say with confidence that a military has developed a new capability?

5. Explain, using the railroad example the difference between the rate of technological advance and the rate of human and organizational adaptation. Think about this difference and be prepared to explain it in your own words...using the railroad example.

Part 2. To be discussed during this lesson or on August 3 (US conventional warfare from 1970s-Today).

6. Apply the ideas contained in the discussion of railroads to the Army's adoption of digital technologies in the 1990s.
- a. Describe, in your own words, the path that Chief of Staff of the US Army, Gen. Gordon Sullivan wanted to put the army on. Why did he think that path was necessary? What was "forcing" the army to change?
 - b. How would Gen. Sullivan answer question about institutionalization: What exactly does "institutionalization" mean in the military context? What are the conditions that allow one to say with confidence that a military has developed a new capability?
 - c. List, and be prepared to discuss, the similarities and differences between the railroad example and the digitization example with respect to having an idea, selling that idea, proving the idea, adopting the idea, institutionalizing the idea, and adapting the idea.
 - d. Think forward: what recent technological innovations as well as those on the horizon may affect military operations? What insights from the railroad and digitalization examples might be helpful in adapting to these innovations?
-

Lesson 7	July 25th
TOPIC	SCHLIEFFEN TO STALEMATE
GUEST CO-INSTRUCTOR	GEN (Ret.) John Allen
GUEST FACULTY	GEN (Ret.) David Petraeus
PURPOSE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Decide which of the following are true: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Trench warfare stalemate resulted from the stupidity of generals.</i> <i>Stalemate was the inevitable result of the military technology of the time.</i> <i>The German attack in 1914 failed because of Moltke's changes to Schlieffen's plan.</i> <i>The 1914 attack failed because Schlieffen designed it mechanistically and in disregard of Moltke's dictum that no plan survives first contact with the enemy.</i> <i>The attack failed because Schlieffen sought Napoleonic-style decisive victories in an era in which they were no longer possible.</i> Why did the war stalemate on the Western Front? How did the various actors try to overcome the stalemate?
OBJECTIVES	Planning vs. execution; is war an engineering problem? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>World War I represented a failure at the tactical level—or at the operational level?—or at the strategic level?</i>
KEY TERMS	<i>Motorized, Mechanized, Mobility; Trench warfare (suite of terms); Infiltration tactics; Michael Offensive</i>
MULTIMEDIA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Videos: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Trench Warfare https://youtu.be/NtfOpb1SG34 German Tactics for 1918 Spring Offensive The Great War Special https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wMfQXPya9zs Tank Development in World War 1 The Great War Special https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zjj13U-j0_g
READINGS	<p><u>BLOCK I:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts, <i>Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine</i> <p><u>BLOCK II: Schlieffen and the First Campaign of World War I</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Terence Zuber, "1920: Kuhl Reveals the Schlieffen Plan," <i>German War</i>

Planning, 1891–1914, pp. 265–71

- Gunther Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, pp. 310–325 (pp. 296–310 in previous lesson).
 - *Another brilliant essay from one of the best compilations of writings about war ever produced. Pay careful attention—there are TWO Helmuth von Moltkes. You have been reading about Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, who introduced railway mobilization and the general staff system to the Prussian Army and led that army through the Wars of German Unification. Now you’ll meet his nephew, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, who will occupy his uncle’s position as Germany approaches and enters World War I. Use this essay to reflect on all of the theoretical and practical debates swirling between Clausewitz, Moltke the Elder, Jomini, and Schlieffen about the nature of war as art, science, or a hybrid.*
 - James L. Stokesbury, *A Short History of World War I*, pp. 22–56 (through the First Marne). **Recommended as overview; not required**—but make sure you understand what happened in 1914 through the First Battle of the Marne
 - Zuber, “The ‘Schlieffen’ Plan,” *German War Planning, 1891–1914: Sources and Interpretations*, pp. 187–204 (Read closely and with a map)
 - *This is the closest we can get to the “Schlieffen Plan,” which was destroyed along with most of the documents relating to Germany’s pre-war planning in a vain attempt to absolve Germany of responsibility for the war. This is NOT the actual plan, however. It is a concept of operations, and a preliminary one. Understand how it was supposed to work. Try to identify logical gaps and potential problems within this document. Then reflect on how much Moltke the Younger was to blame for the “failure” of the “Schlieffen Plan.” Finally, think about what this debate says about the nature of war.*
 - Timothy Lupfer, *The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War*, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1981 (58 pages)
<https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/leavenworth-papers-4-the-dynamics-of-doctrine.pdf>
 - *This is the only reading this lesson that describes the nature and challenges of trench warfare— understanding that is more important than mastering the details of infiltration tactics.*
-

	July 26th
PURPOSE	Reading Day

Lesson 8	July 27th
TOPIC	ARMORED WARFARE & OPERATIONAL ART
GUEST CO-INSTRUCTOR	
PURPOSE	<i>Understand the evolution of operational art as a distinct branch of military theory and practice.</i>
OBJECTIVES	<i>Learning from success and failure: How did the combatants of WWI try to envision the next war and adapt their forces to fight it?</i>
KEY TERMS	<i>Blitzkrieg, Operational Art, Front, Deep battle</i>
MULTIMEDIA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Videos: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ What was the Blitzkrieg? The Blitzkrieg Explained as Short as Possible https://youtu.be/bClvk6T_CYQ ○ Weaponology – “Blitzkrieg” https://youtu.be/H4krV180eRQ ○ Blitzkrieg in the West – The Invasion of France, WWII, May 18, 1940 https://youtu.be/DLN8NHXiMy0
READINGS	<p>“Coping with Trench-Warfare Stalemate”</p> <p><i>This block is pivotal for understanding the evolution of armored warfare, so do not skip it. Make sure that you read the Lupfer without fail.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • David Glantz, Chapters 2, 4, and 5, “The Nature of Operational Art,” “The Formative Years of Soviet Operational Art,” and “The Great Patriotic War and the Maturation of Operational Art,” <i>Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle</i>, (New York: Frank Cass, 1991) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <i>Make sure you get to this reading. The Germans took armored warfare and operational art one way—the Soviets took it somewhere rather different. Make sure you can sense the differences.</i> • J. F. C. Fuller, “The Application of Recent Developments in Mechanics and Other Scientific Knowledge to Preparation and Training for Future War on Land,” Gold Medal (Military) Prize Essay in the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 1919 https://rusi.org/publication/rusi-journal/war-land-application-recent-developments-mechanics-and-other-scientific • J. F. C. Fuller, “Plan 1919” • Michael Geyer, Chapter 19, “German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914–1945,” in <i>Makers of Modern Strategy</i> • Robert M. Citino, <i>Quest for Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg</i>

in Europe, 1899–1940

- Second half of Chapter 6, the Interwar Years, pp. 193–213 (from “Germany: Doctrine and Developments”) as well as Chapter 8, (“Operational Art Reborn”), pp. 251–83

Lesson 9	July 28th
TOPIC	AIRPOWER—DOUHET TO WARDEN FROM THE ORIGINS OF AIR POWER THEORY TO ITS MODERN STATE & US CONVENTIONAL WARFARE
GUEST CO-INSTRUCTORS	
PURPOSE	<i>Understand the terms and concepts of air power theory as it evolved from early in the 20th century to the present; Understand how the US prepared for, won, and learned from the Gulf War</i>
OBJECTIVES	<p>The search for the silver bullet: Can we fight by air alone?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <i>1. Understand the rationale for seeing airpower as fundamentally revolutionary in the first half of the 20th Century.</i> <i>2. Evaluate the nature of the debate over the right relationship between airpower and other forms of military power in that time.</i> <i>3. Master the concept of “center of gravity” as it is used in the context of airpower theory.</i> <i>4. Compare and contrast the airpower view of the enemy (and how to operate against him) with the view presented by operational art theory. Consider both operational art and airpower theory in the context of nonlinearity, complexity, and chaos theory.</i> <i>5. Understand the American theory and practice of conventional warfare at the end of the 20th century.</i> <i>6. Examine different approaches to the problem of designing military doctrine based on observation of contemporary wars and the study of adversary intentions and theory.</i> <i>7. Evaluate competing explanations for the outcome of the first Gulf War and their implications for the future of American war-fighting.</i> <i>8. Consider the continuities and discontinuities of warfare over many changes in technology throughout the 20th century.</i> <i>9. Evaluate the nature of the debate over the right relationship between airpower and other forms of military power.</i> <i>10. Contrast the experience of the Gulf War with the other US military deployments of the 1990s.</i>
KEY TERMS	<i>Air power; Strategic bombing; Center of gravity; Air superiority; Air supremacy; Close air support; Parallel warfare; Active Defense</i>

<p>MULTIMEDIA</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Videos: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Victory Through Air Power: Animated History of Aviation (1942) https://youtu.be/tUeKeN9bXSE ○ Airpower in WWI https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s1oxX4Q6ndo ○ Tactical and Strategic Power in WWII https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kTir8MxxtFk ○ Airpower in the Korean War https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nWbZYp7PY24 ○ Airpower in Vietnam https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wK2BHLMH32Q • Videos: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The 1st Gulf War, Battle of 73 Easting https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tJNk7DcFIkk ○ Airpower in the 1st Gulf War https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LNH-kCdtEaw
<p>READINGS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • David Deptula, “Defining Rapid Decisive Operations: Parallel Warfare,” in <i>Effects-Based Operations: Changes in the Nature of War</i>, pp. 3–7 http://www.ausairpower.net/PDF-A/AEF-AFA-Effect-Based-Operations-D.A.Deptula-2001.pdf • David MacIsaac, “Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists,” <i>Makers of Modern Strategy</i>, Chapter 21, pp. 624–47 • John Warden, “The Air Campaign in Retrospect,” <i>The Air Campaign</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <i>This is a long reading, but students should focus on Chs. 1, 2, 10, “The Air Campaign in Retrospect.”</i> • NOT REQUIRED BUT HIGHLY RECOMMENDED FOR YOUR FUTURE EXPLORATION: John F. Boyd’s briefings are available at https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_0151_Boyd_Discourse_Winning_Losing.PDF <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <i>These readings are seminal works shaping the evolution of American airpower theory—and, thus, of the world’s airpower theory. The recommended papers are:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 41.5 – Abstract • 42 – Pattern • 43 – The Strategic Game of ? and ? • 45 - Winning and Losing

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Summary Report, pp. 1–27, (“What happened?”), and 235–53 (“Was Desert Storm a Revolution in Warfare?”), <i>Gulf War Air Power Survey</i> • Stephen Biddle, “Victory Misunderstood: What the Gulf War Tells Us about the Future of Conflict,” 1996 • H.R. McMaster, “Eagle Troop, Second Squadron, Second Armored Cavalry Regiment,” <i>The Bridge</i>, February 26, 2016 • H.R. McMaster, “What We Learned: From the Battle of 73 Easting” • Stephen D. Biddle, <i>Commentary on “Victory Misunderstood”</i>
LESSON PLAN	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Airpower and airpower alone? The first theorists, the first adopters, strategic bombing, the later theorists/adopters 2. Parallel Warfare 3. What would Clausewitz say? 4. Modernization in 1990 5. Gulf War and Battle of 73 Easting 6. The Gulf War and the discussion of ground war vs. airpower triumphalism (Warden, Deptula, and Biddle readings)

Lesson 10	July 29th
TOPIC	US UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE - IRAQ
GUEST CO-INSTRUCTORS	
GUEST FACULTY	GEN (Ret.) Stanley McChrystal
PURPOSE	<i>Understand the post-Cold War conflicts of the 1990s; learn about the two decades of war post-9/11</i>
OBJECTIVES	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Understand why the Iraq War became an insurgency and how the US recognized and adapted to the insurgency overtime.</i> 2. <i>Understand core elements of the US counterinsurgency approach.</i>
KEY TERMS	
MULTIMEDIA	
READINGS	<p><u>Morning: General McChrystal</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • For our speaker: Stanley McChrystal, <i>My Share of the Task</i>, pp. 89–263 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ <i>Students should begin this reading, focusing on the narrative of the creation of the Joint Special Operations Task Force and reflecting on how the principles embodied in that organization reflect the theories and history articulated in other lessons.</i> <p><u>Afternoon</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kimberly Kagan, <i>The Surge</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◦ Read: Intro, Chs 1-2, Chs 4-5, Ch 7, Conclusion ◦ Skim: Ch 3, Ch 6 • Army FM 2-24: Counterinsurgency (2006) [Ch 1; skim remainder] • H.R. McMaster, “The Human Element,” <i>World Affairs</i> • H.R. McMaster, “Assessment of the Counterinsurgency Effort in Iraq” (October 2003) • George Packer, “The Lessons of Tel Afar,” <i>The New Yorker</i>
LESSON PLAN	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What was AQI's strategic objective in Iraq? 2. What were the Shia militias' strategic objectives in Iraq? 3. How did the coalition define the problem in Iraq? 4. Outline the grand strategic, strategic, operational, and tactical objectives that led to The Surge. 5. What did each group - AQI, Shia, and Coalition - assess to be the center of gravity? 6. How did the coalition link tactical actions to operational and strategic objectives? 7. What are the implications of The Surge for military theory?

Lesson 11	July 30th
TOPIC	RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR
GUEST CO-INSTRUCTORS	
GUEST FACULTY	LTG (Ret.) H.R. McMaster Mason Clark
PURPOSE	<i>Understand how state adversaries have attempted to circumvent US conventional superiority</i>
OBJECTIVES	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. How does the Russian military system differ from NATO and Ukraine? What are the strengths and weaknesses of that system? 2. How have Russian military capabilities evolved since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine? To what degree are changes in Russian capabilities driven by the character of the war in Ukraine versus the culture and processes of the Russian military? 3. What Russian weaknesses could Ukrainian forces exploit? What does Ukraine require in order to take advantage of those Russian weaknesses?
KEY TERMS	
MULTIMEDIA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • [interactive article] Paul Sonne, Isabelle Khurshudyan, Serhiy Morgunov and Kostiantyn Khudov, “Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian valor, Russian blunders combined to save the capital,” <i>Washington Post</i>, August 24, 2022
READINGS	<p><u>Main readings</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fredrick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, et al. “Ukraine and the Problem of Restoring Maneuver in Contemporary War,” <i>Institute for the Study of War</i>, August 12, 2024. <p><u>Initial Russian force structure and early failures</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Charles Bartles, “Foreword – How to Evaluate the Modernized Russian Military’s Performance in Ukraine,” <i>Jamestown Foundation</i>, April 22, 2022. • Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, “Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated Force-Design,” <i>War on the Rocks</i>, June 2, 2022. • Amos C. Fox, “Reflections on Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine: Combined Arms Warfare, The Battalion Tactical Group and Wars in a Fishbowl,” <i>Association of the United States Army</i>, September 29, 2022. • Paul Sonne, Isabelle Khurshudyan, Serhiy Morgunov and Kostiantyn Khudov, “Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian valor, Russian blunders combined to save the capital,” <i>Washington Post</i>, August 24, 2022. <p><u>Key ISW updates on phases of the war</u></p> <p><u>NOTE: you are only required to read the “topline” sections of each of these</u></p>

updates (the sections before the bullet point key takeaways).

- Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, and Frederick W. Kagan, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 11 [Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast],” *Institute for the Study of War*, September 11, 2022.
- Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Madison Williams, Yekaterina Klepachuk, Nicholas Carl, and Mason Clark, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 9 [Russia Withdraws across Dnipro River],” *Institute for the Study of War*, November 9, 2022.
- Riley Bailey and Kateryna Stepanenko, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 30, 2023 [Russian Command Changes],” *Institute for the Study of War*, April 30, 2023.
- Karolina Hird, “Russia’s Military Restructuring and Expansion Hindered by the Ukraine War,” *Institute for the Study of War*, November 12, 2023.
- Riley Bailey and Frederick W. Kagan with Nicole Wolkov and Christina Harward, “The Russian Winter-Spring 2024 Offensive Operation on the Kharkiv-Luhansk Axis,” *Institute for the Study of War*, February 21, 2024.
- Riley Bailey and Frederick W. Kagan, “How Delays in Western Aid Gave Russia the Initiative: From the Ukrainian Counteroffensive to Kharkiv,” *Institute for the Study of War*, May 22, 2024.
- Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, et al, “Assessing the Significance of the Current Russian and Ukrainian Operations for the Course of the War,” *Institute for the Study of War*, August 17, 2024.
- Angelica Evans, “The Ukrainian Defense of Pokrovsk Has Compelled Russia to Change its Approach in Eastern Ukraine,” *Institute for the Study of War*, November 17, 2024.
- Christina Harward, Angelica Evans, et al. “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 19, 2024 [1,000th Day of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine],” *Institute for the Study of War*.
- Kateryna Stepanenko, “Russian Efforts to Centralize Drone Units May Degrade Russian Drone Operations,” *Institute for the Study of War*, December 13, 2024.
- Angelica Evans, “Ukraine’s Kursk Incursion: Six Month Assessment,” *Institute for the Study of War*, February 6, 2025.
- Grace Mappes, “Russia Has Failed to Break Ukraine,” *Institute for the Study of War*, February 24, 2025.
- Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, et al. “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 14, 2025 [Russian Rates of Advance and Likely Operational Planning in mid-2025],” *Institute for the Study of War*, July 14, 2025.

The evolution of Russian capabilities

- Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi, Jack Watling, Oleksandr V. Danylyuk, and Nick

	<p>Reynolds, “Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February-July 2022,” <i>Royal United Services Institute</i>, November 30, 2022.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dr Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine,” <i>Royal United Services Institute</i>, May 19, 2023. • Dr Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Stormbreak: Fighting Through Russian Defences in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive,” <i>Royal United Services Institute</i>, September 4, 2023. • Dr Jack Watling, Oleksandr V Danylyuk and Nick Reynolds, “Preliminary Lessons from Ukraine’s Offensive Operations, 2022-23,” <i>Royal United Services Institute</i>, July 18, 2024. • Michael Kofman, “Assessing Russian Military Adaptation in 2023,” <i>Carnegie Endowment for International Peace</i>, October 8, 2024. • Dr Jack Watling, Nick Reynolds, “Tactical Developments During the Third Year of the Russo–Ukrainian War,” <i>Royal United Services Institute</i>, February 14, 2025. <p><u>Putin’s Theory of Victory</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nataliya Bugayova and Fredrick W. Kagan with Kateryna Stepanenko, “Denying Russia’s Only Strategy for Success,” <i>Institute for the Study of War</i>, March 27, 2024. • Riley Bailey, Christina Harward, et al. “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 7, 2024 [Putin’s Theory of Victory],” <i>Institute for the Study of War</i>, June 7, 2024.
LESSON PLAN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Introduction to modern Russian military thinking with a focus on its differences from US/NATO mechanized warfare • Overview of the war in Ukraine

Lesson 12	July 31st
TOPIC	CHANGING CHARACTER OF WARFARE
GUEST CO-INSTRUCTOR	
GUEST FACULTY	Mason Clark Kateryna Stepanenko
MULTIMEDIA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LTG Alexis Grynkeiwich, CNAS, Virtual Mission Brief: Innovation and Experimentation: A New Approach for the US Airforce in the Middle East: https://www.cnas.org/events/mission-brief-grynych • ISW Interactive Map of Russian Military Objects within Range of ATACMs: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgroundunder/interactive-map-hundreds-known-russian-military-objects-are-range-atacms • Missile Defense Agency DoD <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ phases of missiles and how they work • Drone videos <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ UKR Drone Use-Tactics (Telegram sourced) ○ 414th Separate Brigade of Strike Unmanned Aerial Systems vs RU Armored Convoys ○ "Fiber-Optic Drones the Anti-Jamming Weapon Changing Ukraine Warfare," Wall Street Journal, July 8, 2025 • Missiles Threat, "Missiles of Iran," <i>Center for Strategic & International Studies</i>, August 10, 2021. Missiles of Iran Missile Threat • Missiles Threat, "Missiles of Israel," <i>Center for Strategic & International Studies</i>, August 10, 2021. Missiles of Israel Missile Threat
READINGS	<p>Theory/Overview Readings</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jack Watling, <i>The Arms of the Future</i>, (London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic, 2024), Intro, Chs 1, 11, 12, Conclusion • Congressional Research Service, US Ballistic Missile Defense <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Defense primer from the Congressional Research Service giving a 3-page summary of US Ballistic Missile Defense strategy and capabilities <p>Russia-Ukraine</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stefan Soesanto, "The Ukrainian Way of Digital Warfighting," <i>Center for Security Studies</i>, July 2024 • Nicole Wolkov, "Special Edition Campaign Assessment: Ukraine's Strike Campaign Against Crimea," <i>Institute for the Study of War</i>, October 8, 2023. • Angelica Evans, "The Ukrainian Defense of Pokrovsk Has Compelled Russia to Change Its Approach in Eastern Ukraine," <i>Institute for the Study of War</i>, November 17, 2024. • Katya Stepanenko, Centralizing Drone Units," <i>Institute for the Study of War</i>,

December 13, 2024.

- Nicole Wolkov, Daniel Mealie, Kateryna Stepanenko, “Ukrainian Strikes Have Changed Russian Naval Operations in the Black,” *Institute for the Study of War*, December 16, 2025.
- Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, George Barros, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 3, 2025,” *Institute for the Study of War*, February 3, 2025.
- Christina Harward, Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Grace Mappes, and George Barros with Nate Trotter, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 22, 2025,” *Institute for the Study of War*, April 22, 2025.
- Katya Stepanenko, “The Battlefield AI Revolution Is Not Here Yet: The Status of Current Russian and Ukrainian AI Drone Efforts,” *Institute for the Study of War*, June 6, 2025.
- Kateryna Stepanenko, Tetiana Trach, Olivia Gibson, and Jessica Sobieski, “Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update June 11, 2025,” *Institute for the Study of War*, June 11, 2025.
- Kateryna Stepanenko, Nate Trotter, Christina Harward, Tetiana Trach, Jennie Olmsted, Olivia Gibson, and George Barros, “Russian Force Generation and Technological Adaptations Update June 27, 2025,” *Institute for the Study of War*, June 27, 2025.
- Olivia Gibson, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, Anna Harvey, Christina Harward, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 6, 2025,” *Institute for the Study of War*, July 6, 2025.
- Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, Anna Harvey, Jennie Olmsted, Olivia Gibson, and Frederick W. Kagan, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 7, 2025,” *Institute for the Study of War*, July 7, 2025.
- Anna Harvey, Jessica Sobieski, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, and Karolina Hird, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 9, 2025,” *Institute for the Study of War*, July 9, 2025.
- Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, Jennie Olmsted, Olivia Gibson, Jessica Sobieski, and Karolina Hird, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 10, 2025,” *Institute for the Study of War*, July 10, 2025.
- Jessica Sobieski, Daria Novikov, Jennie Olmsted, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan with Nate Trotter, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 11, 2025,” *Institute for the Study of War*, July 11, 2025.

Middle East

General overview of each of their capabilities with helpful maps

- Brian Carter and Frederick W. Kagan, “Iran’s Attempt to Hit Israel with a Russian-Style Strike Package Failed...for Now,” *Institute for the Study of War*, April 14, 2024.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jamie Dettmer, “How Israel Foiled Iran’s Attack,” <i>Politico</i>, April 14, 2024. • David S. Cloud, “How The US Forged A Fragile Middle Eastern Alliance to Repel Iran’s Israel Attack,” <i>The Wall Street Journal</i>, April 15, 2024. • Alexandra Braverman, Annika Ganzeveld, Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Siddhant Kishore, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter, “Iran Update, October 1, 2024,” <i>Institute for the Study of War</i>, October 1, 2024. Iran Update, October 1, 2024 • Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter, “Iran Update Special Edition: Israeli Strikes on Iran, June 12, 2025,” <i>Institute for the Study of War</i>, June 12, 2025. • Andie Parry, Nicholas Carl, and Annika Ganzeveld, “Iran Update Special Edition: Israeli Strikes on Iran, June 13, 2025,” <i>Institute for the Study of War</i>, June 13, 2025. • Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Kelly Campa, Avery Borens, Johanna Moore, Nidal Morrison, Nicholas Carl, Andie Parry, Annika Ganzeveld, and Brian Carter, “Iran Update Special Edition: Israeli Strikes on Iran, June 13, 2025, 2:00 PM ET,” <i>Institute for the Study of War</i>, June 13, 2025. • Benjamin Jense, “Ungentlemanly Robots: Israel’s Operation Rising Lion and the New Way of War,” <i>Center for Strategic & International Studies</i>, June 13, 2025. • Avery Borens, Ben Schmida, Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Kelly Campa, Johanna Moore, Carolyn Moorman, Andie Parry and Brian Carter, “Iran Update Special Report, June 24, 2025, Evening Edition,” <i>Institute for the Study of War</i>, June 24, 2025.
LESSON PLAN	

Lesson 13	August 1st
TOPIC	CHINA
GUEST CO-INSTRUCTORS	
GUEST FACULTY	Dan Blumenthal Alexis Turek
PURPOSE	<i>Understand how state adversaries have attempted to circumvent US conventional superiority</i>
OBJECTIVES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the central ideas of Chinese military strategy? How does China's way of war compare to that of other countries you have studied? • How has China's military strategy changed since the introduction of the 1993 Military Strategic Guidelines? What geopolitical conditions had the greatest impact on this strategic change? • What impact do you believe PLA military modernization will have on the future of Chinese warfare?
KEY TERMS	
READINGS	<p><u>Historical</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Paul Godwin, "Change and Continuity in Chinese Military Doctrine, 1949-1999, Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949," Ch. 2 • M. Taylor Fravel, <i>Active Defense: China's Military Strategy Since 1949</i>, Chs. 2 and 5 • S.C.M. Paine, "Mao Zedong and Strategies of Nested War," <i>The New Makers of Modern Strategy</i> • Andrew Scobell, <i>China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March</i>, Chs. 4 and 6 <p><i>Supplemental</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Larry Wortzel, "China's Foreign Conflicts since 1949," <i>A Military History of China</i> <p><u>Modernization/Modern Way of War</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • M. Taylor Fravel, "The 1993 Strategy: 'Local Wars Under High-Technology Conditions,'" <i>Active Defense</i>, Ch. 6 • Rush Doshi, <i>The Long Game</i>, Chs. 4 and 8 • Roderick Lee and Marcus Clay, "Don't Call it a Gray Zone: China's Use-of-Force Spectrum," <i>War on the Rocks</i> • Dean Cheng "PLA Perspectives on Network Warfare in Informationized Local Wars," US Congressional Testimony • US Department of Defense, <i>Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China</i> (2024) • Howard Wang and Brett Zakheim, <i>China's Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War</i>, Chs. 3 and 4

	<p><u>Taiwan</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan, “China’s Three Roads to Controlling Taiwan” <i>AEI</i>, May 2023 • Riley Bailey and Frederick W. Kagan, “Defense of Taiwan with Ukrainian Characteristics: Lessons from the War in Ukraine for the Western Pacific,” <i>Institute for the Study of War</i>, 2024. • Andrew Krepinevich, “Archipelagic Defense 2.0,” <i>Hudson Institute</i>, September 2023
<p>LESSON PLAN</p>	<p><u>Historical</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What was Mao’s strategy for revolution? What effect did the transition from guerilla tactics/mobile warfare to maneuver operations have on PLA campaign operations in the three major campaigns of the Chinese Civil War? <p><u>PRC Military Thinking Post-Korean War</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What is Active Defense? How does it differ from previous operational strategies used by the PLA? What impact might Active Defense have on the conduct of future wars? 2. What do you see as the biggest changes in PLA strategy since the Chinese Civil War? <p><u>Political Warfare</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What is the Chinese conception of political warfare? What impact has it had on Chinese strategy? <p><u>Future</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What are the PLA strategies of informatization and intelligentization? What technological and strategic innovation would be necessary for the PLA to effectively enact either of these strategies in a future conflict? 2. What new technologies do you think will have the biggest impact in a future war with China? How do you see China’s technological advancement impacting overall PLA force posture? 3. China has not fought a war since 1979, and have thus closely studied the wars fought by other countries. What lessons from recent wars do you believe will have an impact on a potential future war over Taiwan? 4. What is China’s “peacetime use of military force” strategy? What should the US and our allies do in response to this employment of force?

Lesson 14	August 2nd
TOPIC	THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE OF WAR
GUEST CO-INSTRUCTORS	
GUEST FACULTY	GEN (Ret.) John Allen & LTG (Ret.) Michael Nagata
PURPOSE	<i>What have we learned?</i>
OBJECTIVES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How can one intelligently speak about the future of war? • What can the study of military history teach us? • Key takeaways and conclusions
KEY TERMS	
MULTIMEDIA	
READINGS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • H.R. McMaster, “The Pipe Dream of Easy War,” <i>The New York Times</i>, July 20, 2013 • Michael Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” <i>Royal United Services Institution Journal</i> 107:625 (1962) • John Allen, Frederick Ben Hodges, Julian Lindley-French, <i>Future War and the Defence of Europe</i> (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2021), “Russia and Europe's northern and eastern flanks,” “Scenario 1,” “Introduction,” “Could NATO (still) defend Europe?”, “Hyperwar: Europe's digital and nuclear flanks,” and “Defending Europe” • Olivia Gibson, Anna Harvey, Daria Novikov, Christina Harward, and Kateryna Stepanenko, “Russia Offensive Campaign Assessment,” <i>Institute for the Study of War</i>, June 1, 2025. • Anna Harvey, Daria Novikov, Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, and George Barros with Nate Trotter and William Runkel, “Russia Offensive Campaign Assessment,” <i>Institute for the Study of War</i>, June 3, 2025. • Christina Harward, Anna Harvey, Grace Mappes, Daria Novikov, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, and Karolina Hird with Nate Trotter and William Runkel, “Russia Offensive Campaign Assessment,” <i>Institute for the Study of War</i>, June 4, 2025. • Review Mick Ryan, <i>War Transformed: The Future of Twenty-First-Century Great Power Competition and Conflict</i>

LESSON PLAN**MORNING:**

- How to think about the future of war?
- Revisiting several key discussions from earlier in the course:
Clausewitz, Napoleon, Railroad and Rifles, Interwar
Modernization, Digitization.

AFTERNOON:

- What did you take away from the course?