



THE TIKVAH FUND

The Ethics of War

April 27, 2015 – May 1, 2015

Dean: Eric Cohen

Instructors: James Dubik and Stephen Rosen

Visiting Speakers: Michael Doran and Vance Serchuk

I. Description:

War is an inescapable part of the human condition, with the course of history and the character of civilizations often shaped by the legacy of past battles and the possibility of future conflicts. Death and memory, heroism and tragedy, love of country and hatred of enemies—the human drama plays out, in sharp relief, on both ancient and modern battlefields.

Like any significant human activity, war raises profound moral questions for statesmen, soldiers, and citizens. When is war moral, and when is war unjust or even barbarous? Are there ethical and legal rules that should govern all warfare, and what happens when our enemies play by different rules? Do new technologies of war fundamentally alter the moral choices we face and the moral issues at stake? How do we deal with tough cases—including preemptive strikes, targeted killing, torture, drones, nuclear deterrence and nuclear proliferation, and the use of civilian shields?

Led by Harvard Professor Stephen Rosen, one of the world's preeminent teachers of strategy, and Gen. James Dubik, one of America's most experienced military leaders, this institute will think morally about war by looking at a series of key moments and great texts in military-political history: How do we evaluate the moral decisions of ancient peoples—such as the Athenians as portrayed in the Melian dialogue, or the Israelites as portrayed in the book of Joshua? Why continue fighting on the Western front in the First World War once the deadlock in the trenches emerged? Why firebomb the cities of Germany and Japan in World War II? Why *not* bomb death camps at Auschwitz? Is it right to use torture for prisoner interrogation in counter-terrorism campaigns? What about campaigns to starve civilians, as in the British blockade of Germany in World War I? And what about recent struggles—in Bosnia, in Iraq, and in Gaza? Or future dilemmas—such as the possibility of a nuclearized Middle East?

Our aim will be to analyze such cases in a way that takes seriously the political and strategic dilemmas, so that our moral judgments will be grounded in the real choices that leaders and citizens face, both in deciding when to fight and how to fight. In addition to lectures and seminar discussions, the course will utilize role playing simulations. Institute participants will be called upon to make ethical arguments for and against alternative courses of action from the standpoints of the statesmen, citizens, and soldiers affected by the decision.

II. Institute Calendar

The Ethics of War April 27– May 1, 2015				
<i>Monday, April 27</i> <i>The Moral Meaning of War:</i> <i>Just War Theory</i> <i>and its Limits</i>	<i>Tuesday, April 28</i> <i>War and the Human</i> <i>Good: Hard Cases 1</i>	<i>Wednesday, April 29</i> <i>War and the Human</i> <i>Good: Hard Cases 2</i>	<i>Thursday, April 30</i> <i>The New Technologies of</i> <i>War and their Moral</i> <i>Challenges</i>	<i>Friday, May 1</i> <i>Current Dilemmas</i>
Welcome Breakfast	Breakfast	Breakfast	Breakfast	Breakfast
8:45 AM – 9:45 AM	8:45 AM – 9:45 AM	8:45 AM – 9:45 AM	8:45 AM – 9:45 AM	8:45 AM – 9:45 AM
The Moral Questions of War <i>Eric Coben and James</i> <i>Dubik</i>	Case #2: Extending <i>ius in bello</i> responsibilities to senior political and military leaders: A Vietnam Case Study <i>James Dubik</i>	Case #4: Blockade and Starvation <i>Stephen Rosen</i>	Case #6: Mutually Assured Destruction in Cold War <i>Stephen Rosen</i>	The Case of Syria
9:45 AM – 12:30 PM	9:45 AM – 12:30 PM	9:45 AM – 12:30 PM	9:45 AM – 12:30 PM	9:45 AM – 12:30 PM
Lunch	Lunch	Lunch	Lunch	Lunch
12:30 PM – 2:30 PM	12:15 PM – 2:30 PM	12:15 PM – 2:30 PM	12:15 PM – 2:30 PM	12:15 PM – 2:30 PM
Case #1: The Fire Bombing of Dresden <i>Stephen Rosen</i>	Case #3: Enhanced Interrogation/Torture <i>Stephen Rosen</i>	Case #5: Humanitarian War: The Case of Libya <i>James Dubik</i>	Case #7: The Roboticization of War <i>James Dubik</i>	The Case of Iran
2:30 PM – 5:15 PM	2:30 PM – 5:15 PM	2:30 PM – 5:15 PM	2:30 PM – 5:15 PM	2:30 PM – 5:15 PM
Opening Dinner, Participant Introductions, and Presentation on Tikvah	Dinner Vance Serchuk in Conversation with James Dubik: Discussion of the Iraq Surge	Dinner	Dinner	
6:00 PM – 8:00 PM	6:00 PM – 8:00 PM	6:00 PM – 8:00 PM	6:00 PM – 8:00 PM	

III. Institute Schedule and Syllabus

<p><i>Monday, April 27</i> <i>The Moral Meaning of War: Just War Theory and its Limits</i> THE MORAL QUESTIONS OF WAR 9:45 am – 12:30 pm</p>	
<i>Lead Instructor</i>	<i>Readings</i>
Eric Cohen and James Dubik	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leo Tolstoy, <i>War and Peace</i> (excerpt) • Stanley Hauerwas, “Sacrificing the Sacrifices of War” (excerpt) • Aldous Huxley, <i>Brave New World</i> (excerpts I and II) • Immanuel Kant, <i>Perpetual Peace</i> (excerpt) • The book of Joshua, chap. 8 • Carl von Clausewitz, <i>On War</i>, Book I Chapter I (excerpt) • Niccolò Machiavelli, “What a Prince Should Do Regarding the Military,” <i>Prince</i>, chap. 14. • Reinhold Niebuhr, “The Bombing of Germany,” <i>Christianity and Society</i> (Summer 1943), pages 222–23 • Michael Walzer, <i>Just and Unjust Wars</i> (New York: Basic Books, 1977), pages 31–33, 282 • George Weigel, “Moral Clarity in a Time of War,” <i>First Things</i> (January 2003)
<p>CASE #1: THE FIRE BOMBING OF DRESDEN 2:30 pm–5:15 pm</p>	
<i>Lead Instructor</i>	<i>Readings</i>
Stephen Rosen	<p><u>Required</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, “Anti-climax and Climax, January-May 1945” and “The Strategic Air Offensive,” <i>The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939–1945, Volume III: Victory</i> (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1961), pages 95–119, 284–89 <p><u>Recommended</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jeremy Rabkin, “Anglo-American Dissent from the European Law of War,” <i>San Diego International Law Journal</i>, vol. 16, no. 1 (2014), pages 1–72

<p><i>Tuesday, April 28</i> <i>War and the Human Good: Hard Cases 1</i> CASE #2: EXTENDING JUS IN BELLO RESPONSIBILITIES TO SENIOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS: A VIETNAM CASE STUDY 9:45 am – 12:30 pm</p>	
<i>Lead Instructor</i>	<i>Readings</i>
James Dubik	<p><u>Required</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • H.R. McMaster, “War Without Direction” (chap. 24), <i>Dereliction of Duty</i> (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), pages 275–99 • Lewis Sorely, “Slogging” and “Epilogue,” <i>Honorable Warrior</i> (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1998), pages 259–74 and 302–4 <p><u>Recommended</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Eliot Cohen, “The Unequal Dialogue” (chap. 7), <i>Supreme Command</i> (New York: Free Press, 2002), pages 208–24 • Brian Orend, “<i>Jus in Bello</i> #1: Just Conduct in War” (chap. 4), <i>The Morality of War</i> (Peterborough: Broadview, 2006), pages 111–51

DEBATE

- Resolved: The traditional principles of *jus in bello* are insufficient to describe the full range of moral responsibilities in the conduct of war.
- Discussion during debate preparation: To whom do the traditional principles of *jus in bello*—identifying legitimate targets in war; the combatant/non-combatant distinction and its rationale; the principles of double effect, double intent, and proportionality; and the balance between due care owed to noncombatants and due risk incurred by combatants—apply. Are these sufficient to cover all moral responsibilities in the conduct of war?
- Post-debate discussion: How would one list the moral responsibilities of senior political and military leaders in the conduct of war? What does “not dying in vain” mean? What are a democracy’s responsibilities to its citizens-who-become soldiers, and how are these responsibilities executed? During a war, how does a democracy balance its need for civil control of the military with its need to wage war effectively? Can senior military leaders resign for matters of principle without challenging a democracy’s need for civil control of its military?

<p><i>Tuesday, April 28</i> <i>War and the Human Good: Hard Cases 1</i> CASE #3: ENHANCED INTERROGATION/TORTURE 2:30 pm–5:15 pm</p>	
<i>Lead Instructor</i>	<i>Readings</i>
Stephen Rosen	<p><u>Required</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Alistair Horne, “The Battle of Algiers” (Chap. 9) and “Lost Round for the F.L.N.” (chap. 10), <i>Savage War of Peace</i> (New York: Viking, 1977), pages 183–207 and 208–30 <p><u>Recommended</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Horne, “<i> Ici, c’est la France</i>” (chap. 2), <i>Savage War of Peace</i>, pages 44–79

DEBATE

- Resolved: The use of torture to end the campaign of bombings against civilians in Algiers was/was not justified.
- Discussion during debate preparation: Is torture justified if it prevents terrorist bombings? What if other intelligence collections also prevent bombings, but are less effective? Is torture justified if it does not inflict permanent physical injuries? In general, are there forms of more or less acceptable torture? If the enemy engages in torture, or is generally cruel, does that make torture more justified? Why or why not? If you plan on governing the population from which the people whom you torture, does that make a difference? What if the people you torture come from outside the country and the local population does not care about them?
- Post-debate discussion: How is the FLN different from Al Qaeda or other non-nationalist terrorists? Is it wrong to torture members of one group but not the other? Why is torture wrong? It causes pain and death, but so does combat. Why is it wrong to hurt prisoners but not soldiers in combat?

Tuesday, April 28
War and the Human Good: Hard Cases 1
DINNER AND DISCUSSION OF THE IRAQ SURGE
6:00pm – 8:00 pm

<i>Lead Instructor</i>	<i>Readings</i>
Vance Serchuk in conversation with James Dubik	<u>Optional</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Two reports sent for Vance

<p><i>Wednesday, April 29</i> <i>War and the Human Good: Hard Cases 2</i> CASE #4: BLOCKADE AND STARVATION 9:45 am – 12:30 pm</p>	
<i>Lead Instructor</i>	<i>Readings</i>
Stephen Rosen	<p><u>Required</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lizzie Collingham, “Japan’s Journey Towards Starvation” (chap. 11), <i>The Taste of War</i> (New York: Penguin, 2012), pages 228–47 • Gerd Hardach, “Food Supply in Wartime” (chap. 5), <i>The First World War: 1914–1918</i> (London: Allen Lane, 1977), pages 108–23 <p><u>Recommended</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hardach, “The Allied Blockade of the Central Powers” (chap. 2), <i>The First World War: 1914–1918</i>, pages 11–34

DEBATE

- Resolved: The starvation of civilian populations in war is/is not ethically justified.”
- Discussion during debate preparation: Does the character of the regime matter when judging whether starving enemy civilians is justified? Is it relevant that while Imperial Germany and Imperial Japan were racist and highly nationalist, so were their enemies. Imperial Germany and Japan were not extreme, ideologically motivated regimes, nor unusually brutal compared to the behavior of other belligerents? Does the absence of effective alternatives justify the use of blockade and starvation? If the alternatives are expected to lead to much higher friendly casualties, is starvation justified? What if you could achieve a compromise peace, not achieve many of your goals, but then avoid the use of starvation? Is starvation still justified, or only justified in order to avoid defeat? If the Allies knew the consequences of blockade for Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, and for Japan in the 1950s and 1960s, should that have affected their decisions?
- Post-debate discussion: What implications does the debate have for the evaluation of economic sanctions that do not starve civilians but that do inflict suffering on civilians? What are the implications for decisions to take military action in order to prevent starvation?

<p><i>Wednesday, April 29</i> <i>War and the Human Good: Hard Cases 2</i> CASE #5: HUMANITARIAN WAR: THE CASE OF LIBYA 2:30 pm–5:15 pm</p>	
<i>Lead Instructor</i>	<i>Readings</i>
James Dubik	<p><u>Required</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Orend, “Jus ad Bellum #1: Resisting Aggression” (chap. 2) and “Jus ad Bellum #2: Non-Classical Wars” (chap. 3), <i>The Morality of War</i>, pages 33–70 and 71–110 • “The Three Pillars of the Responsibility to Protect” <i>Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect</i> • Stephen M. Walt, “More to Read About Libya,” <i>Foreign Policy</i> (Apr 14, 2011) • W. W., “Intervention in Libya: Taking Humanitarian Justification Seriously,” <i>The Economics</i> (Mar 23, 2011) • Plain Dealer Staff, “Libyan Intervention: The White House Releases Official Justification,” <i>Cleveland.com</i> (Jun 15, 2011) • Chris Stephen, “Partition of Libya Looms as Fight for Oil Sparks Vicious New Divide,” <i>The Guardian</i> (Mar 15, 2014) • “Fear, Silence in Libya as Divisions Deepen,” <i>Kuwait Times</i> (Feb 17, 2015) • Steve Fox, “Analysis: NATO Deeply Divided Over Libya,” <i>Middle East Eye</i> (Dec 1, 2014) • Jack Moore, “Al Qaeda ‘Islamic Police’ on Patrol in Libyan City Contested With ISIS,” <i>Newsweek</i> (Jan 29, 2015) <p><u>Recommended</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kenneth R. Rutherford, “Ineffective Efforts to Stop the Chaos and Death” (chap. 2) and “President Bush Sets Out to Save Somalia” (chap. 3), <i>Humanitarianism Under Fire</i> (Sterling, Va.: Kumarian, 2008), pages 38–89 • Rupert Smith, “Introduction: Understanding Force,” <i>The Utility of Force</i> (New York: Knopf, 2007), pages 3–28

DEBATE

- Resolved: The Libyan intervention met neither the standard for “probability of success” nor “proportionality.” It was, therefore, not morally justified.
- Discussion during debate preparation: How does a nation determine “probability of success” and “proportionality?” Do they even bother? Are the “calculations” different for conventional war, irregular war, and humanitarian assistance? If they are, what makes them different?
- Post-debate discussion: Can any humanitarian intervention ever meet the “probability of success” and “proportionality” standard? If so, what are those conditions? How are the “filters” used to decide to go to war—strategic, legal, moral, and prudential—related to one another? How far does respecting a political community’s right to determine its own future go? How much weight should nations give to the principle of non-intervention? Other than for self-defense reasons, how does a nation know when to “violate” the principle of non-intervention? Does the principle of non-intervention apply to “pre state” or “emerging state” political communities?

<p><i>Thursday, April 30</i> <i>The New Technologies of War and their Moral Challenges</i> CASE #6: MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION IN COLD WAR 9:45 am – 12:30 pm</p>	
<i>Lead Instructor</i>	<i>Readings</i>
Stephen Rosen	<p><u>Required</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • John Lewis Gaddis, <i>Strategies of Containment</i> (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pages 212–21, 349–53 (excerpts) • Herman Kahn, “Alternative National Strategies” (chap. 1), <i>On Thermonuclear War</i> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pages 3-21

DEBATE

- Resolved: Mutual Assured Destruction that deliberately chooses a strategy of mass killing is/is not justified.
- Discussion during debate preparation: What are the alternatives to MAD? How do we decide/know the alternatives are better or worse, since no one has ever fought a war in which both sides use nuclear weapons? If killing 50 million people in a planned nuclear retaliation is good, would killing 150 million be even better? If a strategy that reduces expected casualties from 50 million to 10 million, why is that better or worse? To 1 million? To 100,000? What if you get into a limited war but it gets out of control? Is it good or bad to have options other than executing the massive retaliation? Suppose deterrence fails, and the enemy launches his weapons at your cities. You know they will be destroyed. Executing your retaliatory strike against the cities of the enemy will not save the lives of your fellow citizens. It may be justified to threaten massive retaliation, but is it justified to go through with it? Is revenge or punishment an adequate justification for killing 100 million people?
- Post-debate discussion: If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, and you have reason to think the Iranian leadership is willing to lose 10 million Iranians dead in order to destroy Israel, does that change your assessment of MAD? If MAD by means of nuclear weapons is justified, is MAD by means of biological weapons justified?

<p><i>Thursday, April 30</i> <i>The New Technologies of War and their Moral Challenges</i> “CASE #7: THE ROBOTICIZATION OF WAR” 2:30 pm–5:15 pm</p>	
<i>Lead Instructor</i>	<i>Readings</i>
James Dubik	<p><u>Required Viewing</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Naval Autonomous Swarm of Boats (6 minutes, 37 seconds) http://www.chonday.com/Videos/swarbaotyj2. • Paul Sharre on the Future of Drones (3 minutes, 21 seconds) http://www.cnas.org/video/paul-scharre-on-the-future-of-drones#.VLk6IT916Ts <p><u>Required Reading</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • David Sanger, “The Dark Side of the Light Footprint” (chap. 10), <i>Confront and Conceal</i> (New York: Crown, 2012), pages 243–70 • Technology Quarterly Q2 2012, “Robots Go to War: March of the Robots,” <i>The Economist</i> (Jun 2, 2012) <p><u>Recommended</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Brianna Lee, “Drones” (Sep 13, 2012) • David Luban, “What Would Augustine Do? The President, Drones, and Just War Theory,” <i>Boston Review</i> (Jun 6, 2012) • Listen to the discussion of U.S. Drone Strikes on the Diane Rheme Show (May 31, 2012) • “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa'ida or An Associated Force,” <i>Department of Justice White Paper</i> (Nov 8, 2011)

DEBATE

- Resolved: Pilots of remotely piloted aircraft, whether armed or not, and those who control other remotely controlled devices should be considered combatants.
- Discussion during debate preparation: What happens the principle of “due care and due risk” on a battlefield full of drones and robots? Does the morality of war’s conduct change when only one combatant entity has this technology? If so, how? If not, why?
- Post- debate discussion: The tools of war are changing: drones and robotics, cyber, eadropping and data collection; merging of war and crime in “war amongst the people.” What new civil-military leadership and organizational structures might this kind of future require? Will the moral requirements of statesmanship and generalship change? If so, in what ways? Are drone pilots, remote robotic operators, and cyber teams combatants? How are the notions of a “theater of war,” “legitimate targets of war,” and “the combatant/noncombatant distinction” affected by drones, robotics, cyber capabilities, and other advances in military technology? Will new *jus in bello* principles emerge, or current ones modified? What might some of the new principles or modification be? What new difficulties will there be in applying new or modified principles? What will likely not change with respect to *jus in bello*?

<i>Friday, May 1</i> <i>Current Dilemmas</i> “THE CASE OF SYRIA” 9:45 am –12:30 pm	
<i>Lead Instructor</i>	<i>Readings</i>
Michael Doran	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The readings will be distributed on Thursday, April 30
“THE CASE OF IRAN” 2:30 pm –5:15 pm	
<i>Lead Instructor</i>	<i>Readings</i>
Michael Doran	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The readings will be distributed on Thursday, April 30

III. Faculty Biographies

Dean

Eric Cohen

Eric Cohen has been the Executive Director of the Tikvah Fund since 2007. He was the founder and remains editor-at-large of the *New Atlantis*, serves as the publisher of the *Jewish Review of Books* and *Mosaic*, and currently serves on the board of directors of the Ethics and Public Policy Center, the Witherspoon Institute, and *National Affairs* and on the Editorial Advisory Board of *First Things*. Mr. Cohen has published in numerous academic and popular journals, magazines, and newspapers, including the *Wall Street Journal*, the *Washington Post*, *Weekly Standard*, *Commentary*, *The New Republic*, *First Things*, and numerous others. He is the author of *In the Shadow of Progress: Being Human in the Age of Technology* (2008) and co-editor of *The Future is Now: America Confronts the New Genetics* (2002). He was previously managing editor of the *Public Interest* and served as a senior consultant to the President's Council on Bioethics.

Instructors

James Dubik

LTG James M. Dubik (U.S. Army, Ret.), a Senior Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War, currently conducts research, writes, and briefs on behalf of the Institute. His areas of focus include MNSTC-I and the Iraqi Security Forces, the ways to improve U.S. and allied training of indigenous security forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and counterinsurgency doctrine. LTG Dubik assumed command of Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) on June 10, 2007. During this final command, he oversaw the generation and training of the Iraqi Security Forces. Previously, he was the Commanding General of I Corps at Ft. Lewis and the Deputy Commanding General for Transformation, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. He also served as the Commanding General of the 25th Infantry Division.

Stephen Rosen

Stephen Peter Rosen is the Beton Michael Kaneb Professor of National Security and Military Affairs at Harvard University. He was the civilian assistant to the director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Political-Military Affairs on the staff of the National Security Council, and a professor in the Strategic Department at the Naval War College. He participated in the President's Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy, and in the Gulf War Air Power Survey sponsored by the Secretary of the Air Force. He has published articles on ballistic missile defense, the American theory of limited war, and on the strategic implications of the AIDS epidemic, and wrote the book, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* which won the 1992 Funriss Prize for best first book on national security affairs awarded by the Merchon Center at Ohio State University. His second book, *Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies*, was published by Cornell University Press in 1995. His next project is on the non-rational aspects of deterrence entitled "Fear and Dominance in International Politics."

Visiting Speakers

Michael Doran

Michael Doran, an expert in U.S. policy toward the Middle East, radical Islam, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. He has held academic appointments at Princeton and the University of Central Florida, and most recently served as visiting professor at the Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, New York University. He has also held a number of senior U.S. government posts related to Middle East policy and strategic communication. Among his scholarly works are *Pan-Arabism before Nasser* (1999) and a forthcoming study of the Eisenhower administration and the Middle East.

Vance Serchuk

Vance Serchuk is executive director of the KKR Global Institute. Prior to joining KKR, Mr. Serchuk served for six years as the senior national security advisor to Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-Connecticut). In this capacity, he worked on a broad range of international issues, including comprehensive sanctions legislation, the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, and the U.S. response to the Arab Spring, traveling to over 60 countries in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. From January to July 2013, he was a Council on Foreign Relations-Hitachi International Affairs Fellow, based in Japan, and a regular columnist for the *Washington Post*. His writings have also appeared in the *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, and *Los Angeles Times*. Mr. Serchuk is a summa cum laude graduate of Princeton University, holds a JD from Yale Law School, and was a Fulbright scholar in the Russian Federation.

IV. Our Mutual Commitment

Our pledge to you is that the program will be excellent and that the teachers are, in every case, among the best people in the world teaching the subjects they are teaching. Your pledge to us is that you will invest yourselves in the texts and the seminars, and do the work to the fullest extent of your talents. You have put your everyday work on hold to join us, so we know you come to us with great interest and commitment. We will insist that you continue that commitment—a commitment to attending each and every session, a commitment to coming to class on time, a commitment to doing all the readings—throughout the duration of the Institute. If anyone fails to honor his or her commitment, he or she will be dismissed from the Institute.