Contrasting Contexts: Yugoslavia, Washington, and Europe

On the Ground in Yugoslavia:

- Wikipedia time line for the breakup of Yugoslavia
- Chris Bennett’s *Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse*, Chapters 5-10.
  - Political and economic structures in Yugoslavia before the collapse
  - Transformation of sub-state actors to state-actors and non-state actors
  - Propaganda as a tool of political discourse
  - Actual causes of the war—why did each actor decide to fight when he did?
  - Explanations of the war—how did each actor explain his reasons for fighting?
- Chapters 15, 16 and epilogue of Noel Malcolm’s *Bosnia: A Short History*
  - Sub-state actors to non-state actors—why do states (or statelets) collapse?
  - Principles of negotiation and realities on the ground (cantonization)
  - International community involvement—what does it look like on the ground?

U.S. Context:

- Weinberger’s speech at the National Press Club on 28 November 1984
  - *This is the “Weinberger Doctrine,” ostensibly defining the conditions under which the U.S. can reasonably intervene abroad. It powerfully influenced Colin Powell and George H. W. Bush.*
- Executive Summary and chapter 1 of Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War*
  - *But the notion of “Operations other than War” was coming into vogue in the 1990s as the U.S. ground forces looked at plausible future missions to inform (justify?) force planning and budgetary requests.*
- Warden’s *The Air Campaign*, review chapters 1, 9 and 10
  - *1990s Air Power theory was also a response to the need (opportunity?) for the US Air Force to explain its view of its role in future war (and, therefore, make its case for its share of the budget).*
- Chapters 18 through the postscript of Bush and Scowcroft’s *A World Transformed*
  - *There’s nothing in this reading about Yugoslavia… What was the White House focused on in 1990 and 1991? How do you think the things the WH focused on affected how the WH perceived the situation in Yugoslavia?*
- Prologue and first five chapters of Holbrooke’s *To End a War*
The view from the State Department was rather different… Reflect both on what was going on and on how the institutional politics affected all actors.


And this is a brief narrative of what actually happened, including the major military activities that occurred before “intervention.” So what is intervention, really? Why does it seem so continuous from some perspectives and so disjointed from others? How do the perspectives of military forces engaged in (theoretically non-)intervention align with diplomatic personnel? How do they align with (or clash with) the perspectives of decision-makers paying fitful attention to the situation?

Thursday, January 2, 2014, 9:00 am to 6:00 PM

“Intervention”: Causes and conduct; the air campaign

The Theoretical Basis for Humanitarian Intervention:

- Michael Walzer’s chapter on interventions, Just and Unjust War, pages 101-108.
- Samantha Power’s statement at the UN in 2013 (http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/214066.htm)

The conflict between sovereignty and humanitarian imperatives—why are both important, and when can/should a state (or the international community) prioritize one over the other?

Perception drives action; what drives perception?

- Robert Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts, at least the first four chapters.
- Video 1: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RKYhaQ3gbsA
- Video 2: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eOjxauzsn8
- Video 3: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ýg9ZQP6CGZU
- Video 4: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2IlUuIfSDkQ

How can you tell what is real in the media?

How did these various narratives shape decision-making in the West?

Did the distortions in the narratives lead to wrong decisions? What would the “right” decisions have been, based on realities on the ground, absent these distortions?

- Chapters 6 through 15 of Holbrooke’s book

Military operations in the service of diplomacy. Was Holbrooke the new Bismarck?
Air Campaign:


  *Why was Deliberate Force an “intervention” when previous military activities in Yugoslavia were not?*
  *When did planning for Deliberate Force begin? (warning: this is a trick question!)*
  *How were coalition forces organized to plan and conduct military operations?*
  *What effects did that organization have on plans and conduct?*
  *How was Deliberate Force planned? Think hard about Warden’s concepts and look for their application.*
  *What were the things preoccupying military leaders before and during the operation? How did those preoccupations align or contrast with the concerns of the diplomats and political leaders?*
  *Was Deliberate Force successful?*

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Friday, January 3, 2014, 9:00 am to 6:00 PM

**Peace enforcement operations-air campaign and initial ground deployment**

- The day focuses on Srebrenica. The 90 minute PBS documentary, “Srebrenica: A Cry from the Grave,” at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fliw801iX84 can substitute for reading. This documentary really puts a personal face on the “strategic problem” Bosnia presented.

  *What happened at Srebrenica, and why?*

Afternoon: War game.

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Saturday, January 4, 2014, 9:00 am to 6:00 PM

**Fighting and Talking**

- Chapters 16-21 of Holbrooke’s book (about 140 pages) covers Dayton and implementation. The previous readings of chapters 6 through 15 will also apply.

  *Was the Dayton agreement a diplomatic triumph?*
  *Did the Dayton agreement achieve its objectives? If so why? If not, why not?*
  *Is Bosnia a model for humanitarian intervention? For conflict termination? Why or why not?*

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Sunday, January 5, 2014, 9:00 am to 6:00 PM

**Bosnia and Syria – a discussion**